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THE NATIONAL HOUSING POLITICAL SYSTEM
BY
Collette Catherine Wood
In this paper, the various groups which -influence policy have
been looked at as a single political system. The systems approach
provides a framework for looking at aT groups - both formal insti-
titutions and private interest groups - which influence housing
policy. A final advantage to this method of analysis is that the
housing political system can be evaluated by comparing actual
policy outcomes with a set of generally accepted objectives. In
particular, the housing political system has been evaluated in this
paper in terms of its ability to generate a large volume of housing
for low-income groups.
Although there are numerous agencies and organizations involved
in housing politics, in general they can be divided into two main
groups: "public-regarding" and "private-regarding." "Public-
regarding" groups tend to have a broad, socially-oriented view toward
housing policy; while "private-regarding" groups tehd to have a narrow,
economically-motivated attitude toward housing policy. Three major
factors emerge concerning the politics of housing, from a study of the
formulation and execution of housing policies. F'irst of all, although
there are by far a larger number of "public-regarding" than "private-
regarding" groups in housing politics, the latter groups possess the
controlling influence vis-a-vis housing policy. Secondly, three-way
linkages exist between certain private associations, certain federal
agencies and certain groups of Congressmen, through which the influ-
ence of private associations is channeled. Thirdly, because of the
ties which exist between them and certain private groups and also
because of their interest in maintaining their bureaucracy, public
agencies, when challenged, act as interest groups, rather than passive
administrators of government policy. An examination of the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) program and the public housing program
helps to illustrate these three major aspects of housing politics and
to bring out their implications.
In order to facilitate the attainment of national housing goals,
the housing political system must be restructured so that"private-regarding"
groups have a direct interest in low-income housing programs and
yet a sufficient degree of control by "public-regarding" groups
is maintained, in order to assure that housing programs will serve
broad public purposes. Within the present system, there are many
obstacles to remaking existing agencies in order to achieve such a
restructuring. In addition, the massive public investment required,
in the face of traditional American reluctance to rely on welfare
assistance, implies that the prospect of any substantial low-income
housing program being carried out in the near future is still doubtful.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes,
Assistant Professor of City and Regional
Planning, M.I.T.
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Preface
Mark Twain once remarked that many of his stories took on a
character of their own as he wrote and thus shaped their own endings.
The situtation in the field of housing is similar, but the outcome
is not as uplifting. In a seemingly inexorable manner, the nature
of the housing political system determines the outcome of housing
policies. Housing programs are enacted with a great deal of rhetoric
and high expectations are engendered, yet no substantial program in
behalf of low-income groups has ever been carried out. In order to
explain this gap between the rhetoric and reality of housing policy in
the United States, I have examined in detail the politics of national
housing policy. The principal contribution of this paper, I feel, lies
in its conceptualization of the housing political system, which shows
that the politics of housing a;re very similar to American politics in
general.
In writing this thesis, the criticism and encouragement of my
advisor, Professor Langley Keyes were invaluable to me and I express
my deepest appreciation to him. Also, I am grateful to John McClaughry,
Fellow of the Kennedy Institute of Politics for offering his views
on housing politics. My conversations with him made me aware of the
importance of practical experience in understanding housing politics.
CHAPTER I
The Systems Approach
I
In this paper, I have viewed, as part of a single political
system, the various groups having an impact on the formulation
and execution of housing policy. The "systems approach" to policy
issues is derived from another contemporary theory. The essence
of this latter theory is that power is the unifying concept in
political science and that the aim of political science is to
understand and to describe human relationships of power and author-
ity. By power, these theorists mean "the ability to affect or to
control the decisions, behavior, policies, values, or fortunes of
others.' This definition implies that power may or may not be
coercive and therefore equates power with the concept of influence.
Some political scientists have preferred to distinguish between
power and influence by saying that power involves coercion while
influence does not, necessarily.2 However, the theory referred
to here believes that "In a world of politics,....relations among
men may be either sufficiently subtle to obscure the presence of
coercion where it does exist, or sufficiently theatrical to sug-
gest the presence of coercion where it does not exist. To avoid
the difficulty which a distinction between political influence and
.Nelson P. Guild and Kenneth T. Palmer. Introduction to
Politics, New York, John Wiley and Sons, c. 1968, p. 7.
2
Ibid.
2political power is bound to create, we have chosen to consider the
terms identical."3 A second implication of the definition of power
in this contemporary theory is that power does not necessarily in-
volve getting people to do something which is against their will.
Rather, "It refers simply to the ability to induce others to act in
some way they might not otherwise act, willingly or unwillingly."4
Although the definition of power which contemporary political sci-
entists use is a broad one, it is also a realistic one, for it
implies that the formulation and execution of policies cannot be
understood without studying the extra-legal role of groups such as
business organizations and civic associations in the political
process. One of the major criticisms of earlier approaches in
political science, such as the use of the "state" as a unit of
analysis, was that they called attention only to formal institutions,
legally established under the state's constitution - legislatures,
bureaucracies, executives, courts - whereas practical experience
indicated that descriptions of such institutions were "secondary
to the analysis of 'powerful' groups and interests in society, the
means they use to achieve their goals, and broadly, the relation-
ships between rulers and the ruled."5
Most important of all, the concept of power used by contemporary
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5..
Ibid., p. 6.
3political scientists implies the existence of a relationship between
persons or groups. Power held by one person or group is always in
reference to another person or group. This aspect of power leads
to the concept of a political system and the specific manifestations
of power with which modern political theorists are concerned. When
a set of power relationships is regular and persistent over time and
involve approximately the same groups or persons, then the set of
relations is referred to as a political system.6 Of course, this
definition of political systems is, like power, a broad definition
and implies that political systems can exist almost anywhere. When
it comes to specifying more clearly which systems are relevant to
political science, theorists are ambiguous because there is no gen-
eral agreement on what is political and what is not political. How-
ever, political scientists consider themselves interested in the
political system, that is the system which represents the nation or
state. Therefore, any other political system is relevant to them -
as a sub-system - if it is involved in some way with the larger
political system.7 Although this test of relevance still is
ambiguous and implies that political science must be concerned
with any persistent set of power relations, for the purposes of
this paper, it is sufficient that the reader understand that I have
used the concept of a political system, described here, as a framework
6Ibid., p. 9.
71bid.
/
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for studying the politics of housing. That is, I have postulated
that a specific set of groups is responsible for housing policy
and that a regular and persistent pattern of relationships exists
among these groups. By looking at these groups and the ties bet-
ween them, one can arrive at an understanding of the generation of
the national housing policy in the United States and can perceive
the real processes through which such policy is determined.
The systems approach in political science provides a realistic,
but organized manner of seeing the numerous groups which affect hous-
ing policy. It is clear that no single group is solely responsible
for making and implementing housing policy. Rather, many groups
and individuals, some directly and some indirectly related to the
formal political structure, are involved in the politics of housing.
As indicated above, the decision as to which groups should be in-
cluded for study in any political system is a difficult one, for a
great deal of empirical study is needed in any given situation to
ascertain whether a power relationship actually exists.8 In this
paper, I have relied on evidence from hearings on housing legisla-
tion, on statements by the groups themselves and on statements by
observers of these groups in deciding which groups have influenced
.housing policy and therefore ought to be included as "actors" in
the political, system under study.. Although further investigation
8I pIbid.., P. 7.
5might reveal a few more peripheral groups in the system, it would
appear that this evidence is sufficient for citing the most influ-
ential groups in the system.
Thus, the aim of the approach used to study the politics of
housing is to perceive the dynamics of housing policy. Given a
set of groups which influence housing policy, how do these "actors"
interact with one another when an issue arises? That is, what are
the real processes out of which housing policy is formulated and
executed? The importance of understanding housing politics has
been best summarized by one author who has pointed out:
S... [Tihe course of housing history makes no
rational sense from any other point of view
[than the political one.] The history of
housing legislation, all in all, makes no
ethical sense, no economic sense, no social
sense. But it makes sense in terms of the
system needs of political bodies.... [although]
this dimension is frequently ignored."9
In order to answer these questions, I have formulated my impressions
of the groups which comprise the "housing political system," the link-
ages between them and the way in which they respond when challenged
by an issue, in the following chapter. In Chapters III and IV, I
have tried to provide a clearer characterization of the politics of
housing through a discussion of two illustrative issues: the Federal
9Lawrence M. Friedman, "Government and Slum Housing: Some General
Considerations," in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXXI, No. 2:
Spring, 1967, pp. 357-370, p. 360.
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6Housing Administration program and public housing. By looking at the
relationship between the actors in the housing political system to
the policy outcomes in these areas, one can hopefully understand how
and why national housing policy has been formulated and executed in
the past and how if changes do not occur, it is likely to be exe-
cuted in the future.
Besides providing an operational framework, the "systems approach"
to political life has another major advantage. In addition to con-
ceptualizing the politics of housing, another aim of this paper will
be to evaluate the way in which housing policy is made and executed.
Understanding the dynamics of the housing political system enables
one to predict what trends are most likely to occur in the future in
housing policy. The gap, if one exists, between these trends and a
generally accepted set of national housing goals sets the focus for
recommending feasible changes within the system which would facili-
tate the attainment of goals. This latter task involves a definition
of national housing objectives; and hence the following section is a
necessary digression to discuss such objectives.
TThe National Housing Act of 1949 contains the most explicit
legislative statement of housing goals for the United States. The
act states that the goal of national housing policy is "a decent
home and suitable living environment for every American family." 1 0
This statement suggests that goals for housing should be qualita-
tive as well as quantitative. Beyond merely providing a shelter
for every American family, the public interest in the general wel-
fare, health and living standards of the nation compels that a
decent home is assured for every American family. Behind this de-
finition of the public interest in housing is the implication that
the benefits to the entire society of providing every individual
with an adequate living environment outweigh the costs of providing
it.
Since the aim of public policy should be to provide for the
satisfaction of otherwise unmet needs, the logical implication of
the 1949 statement of goals is that policy should be directed toward
the sectors of the population which private industry is most unlikely
to serve. These sectors can best be defined through a measurement of
total housing needs and of effective demand. The resulting gaps
between those groups in need of standard housing and those able to
afford it..in. the, pr.ivate market indicates the area where public
10
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency Hous-
ing Act of 1949, 81st Congress, First Session, Washington, D.C., 1949.
N8
policy ought to focus.
Interwoven with the determination of housing need is the
problem of housing standards. Any statement of need implies
that some set of criteria were used to define adequate living
standards or "decent housing." However, the definition of minimum
housing standards has been given little attention in housing
research in the United States. In the past, the U.S. Bureau of
Census has classified housing in one of three categories: sound,
deteriorating and dilapidated. These categories refer to the
condition of the physical structure: deteriorating housing requires
repairs beyond those made in the normal course of maintenance and
dilapidated housing requires repairs which constitute critical
defects, such that the dwelling "does not provide safe and ade-
quate shelter and in its present condition endangers the health,
safety, or well-being of the occupants." Further distinctions
are made between housing with and without plumbing facilities.
The Census standards, along with most housing standards set by
banks, insurance companies, the Federal Housing Administration,
the Veterans Administration and local building and zoning codes
concentrate on specific physical items of the housing construction.
As one expert puts it, such standards amount to "no more than a
consensus of experts who combine their judgments on how people
1 1Bernard J. Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals: Old
Policies. and New Realities" in James Q. Wilson, ed., The Metropoli-
tan Enigma, Washington, D.C., Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, c. 1967, pp. 148-193, p. 151.
9prefer to live and how they ought to live." 1 2 Recent research has
begun to attack the arbitrary way in which housing standards have
been set in the past. These studies have recognized that housing
standards are not absolute, but are a function of the total social
situation in which an individual or family is living. As Richard
Ratcliffe has observed:
".. .the only standards which [should] have rele-
vance in housing programs are those which have
their basic expression in human values...... it
should also be recognized that the concept of
standards has meaning at all levels of housing
quality.... It is shocking, therefore, to contem-
plate the continued setting of standards by
legislative act, by judicial decision, by admin-
istrative determination, by the business judg-
ments of builders and bankers, by the pencils of
architects, and land planners, by the unenlight-
ened or forced choices of consumers, standards
which may perpetuate socially-dangerous living
conditions for millions of families, all without
benefit of a valid measurement or real understand-
ing of the true impact of housin attributes on
physical and mental well-being.
The invalidity of absolute housing standards is reflected in the
common knowledge that what is considered minimum living require-
ments in our country differs from norms held in other countries,
as a result of differences in values and resources. The same
principle applies to individuals and groups within -our country.
1 2Richard V. Ratcliff, "Housing Standards," in William L.C.
Wheaton, Grace Milgram, and Margy Ellen Meyerson, eds., Urban Hous-
ing, New Yor., The Free Press, c. 1966, pp. 391-394, p. 392.
13lbid., pp, 392-393.
10
For example, a student couple will be willing to sacrifice many
physical amenities in order to enjoy an education. Similarly,
sociologists have often found that slum dwellers, contrary to
typical middle-class assumptions, are often satisfied with their
surroundings. Either external condition's camouflage the fact
that housing is clean and comfortable within or residents, par-
ticularly older people, prefer the security of familiar community
surroundings. Ideally, then, housing standards should be set by
studying carefully human reactions to specific physical features
and allowing people to choose a design, based on their awareness
of its cost, functional and "cultural" aspects.1 5
Despite the problems in defining standards and therefore of
precisely measuring needs, most experts would agree that, regard-
less of what criteria are used, the most critical unmet housing
needs are found in the low-income sector of the population. In
1960, 36% of persons in the lower third income sector of the popu-
lation lived in substandard housing, whereas in the middle and
upper third income brackets these percentages were only 14% and
4%, respectively.16 The burden upon lower income groups is even
greater when one also takes into account the percent of their in-
come, which low-Income groups must. spend for housing. A generally
14
See for example Herbert Gans, The Urban Villagers, New York,
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
l*atcliffe, 
_, cit., p. 392.
1 ernard Frieden, "Housing and National Urban Goals: Old Poli-
cies and New Realities" in James Q. Wilson, ed. The Metropolitan
Enigma, Washington D.C., Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
c. 1967, pp. 149-201, p. 159.
11
accepted standard is that twenty percent is a reasonable percentage
of income for rent; but eighty-nine percent of the people in the
lower third income bracket pay more than twenty percent of the in-
come for rent. In contrast, in the upper third income bracket only
ten percent fall into this category and in the middle third only
17
forty-six percent. A high rent income ratio not only implies that
poor people are paying high rents, but also that they must sacrifice
expenditures for other needs, such as food and clothing. Another
generally accepted average is that persons should spend about two
and one-half times their income when buying a house. Given an
average construction cost in 1966 of $17,000 for private single
family housing and $12,625 for publicly-owned housing,1 8 this rule
of thumb suggests that it is impossible for low-income groups to
purchase new housing. With incomes less than $4,000,l9 the lower
third of the population should only pay $10,000 for such housing.
In short, the relation between low-income people and poor housing
can be emphasized in numerous ways. One final, but perhaps most
important indication is that given in an Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity study which showed that poor housing is one of the major
17
Ibid., p. 162.
18
Nathaniel S. Keith, "National Housing Needs" in Law and Con-
temporary Problems, Vol. XXX11, No. 2: Spring, 1967, pp. 209-219,
p. 213.
19
Charles Abrams, The City is the Frontier, New York, Harper &
Row, c. 1965, p. 25.
12
concerns of poor people themselves. 2 0
To summarize, it is very difficult to place a quantitative tag
on housing needs, because of the fact that there are no valid cri-
teria for defining "decent housing." For the purposes of this paper,
however, it will be assumed, backed by substantial evidence, that the
sector of most critical need is the low income segment of the popu-
lation. The needs of this group have persisted, despite the fact
that federal housing programs have been in existence for over thirty
years. Insights into the politics of housing should enable one to
understand why no substantial housing program has been directed toward
low-income groups in the past and whether such an outcome is likely
to persist in the future.
20Frieden, op. cit., p. 151.
CHAPTER II
The System
+:-:4y4
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Housing is a complex issue which touches upon the interests of a
large number of diverse groups. Housing is both a basic necessity and
a good produced in the private market; and therefore it introduces many
conflicts between public and private goals. It is an area of social
concern where the needs of groups which cannot afford housing in the
private market, or cannot obtain it because of discrimination, must be
met; and among these groups - urban and rural poor, Negroes and Whites,
elderly, large families and handicapped persons - priorities must be
determined. It is a need whose sociological and psychological impor-
tance has been assumed without much definitive research. As brought
out in the previous chapter, direct causal relationships between hous-
ing and such attributes as motivation, self-perception, family stabil-
ity, economic stability, juvenile delinquency, and health have not
really been established and much study is also needed into the socio-
logical and psychological role of housing in relation to its total
environment.
As an industry, housebuilding is comprised of many independent
operations which are inefficiently coordinated. Many different or-
ganizations, such as large and small builders, private owners, churches
and other non-profit sponsors, limited dividend corporations, public
agencies, cooperative associations, land developers and realtors, in-
itiate the housebuilding process; while numerous other groups, such
as building materials manufacturers and suppliers, labor, Federal
agencies, municipal bodies, realtors, commercial banks, mortgage
banks, life insurance companies, and savings and loan associations,
participate in it. None of these actors is economically or politi-
cally strong enough - to exercise tight control over the other opera-
tors.
In addition, residential construction activity accounts for an
important part of gross national product and fixed private domestic
investment; and therefore housing bears on economic problems such as
employment, inflation and monetary policy. These numerous aspects
of housing policy provide access for many different agencies and or-
ganizations into housing politics.
It is difficult to place the diverse, housing interest groups
into neat categories. Some of the interests are direct or indirect
economic ones, such as those of private business organizations. The
interest of other groups (National Housing Conference, National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People) stems from the purposes
of their organizations and the way in which housing relates to these
purposes. Others are agencies (Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FBLBB)) which are responsible for administering cer-
tain housing programs; and others are politicians, whose role involves
responding to the housing needs of their constituents. Despite the
agreement among all these groups on basic housing goals, there is
frequent disagreement on specific policy questions of "how, what, when
and for whom." It does seem valid, however, to divide housing interests
15
into two major categories - one of which will be called "public
regarding" and the other "private regarding." The "public-regarding"
groups represent people who emphasize the aspects of housing which re-
late to the public interest and general welfare of society. Basically,
their position is that the private market is unable to produce low-cost
housing and therefore the Federal government has a direct responsibility
in subsidizing housing for the poor. These poeple are usually referred
to as "public housers" or "professional housers." Many of their groups,
such as the National Housing Conference, the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the National Asso-
ciation of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, were among the original
*In this paper, I have borrowed the terms "public-regarding" and
private-regarding" from James Q. Wilson's article: "Planning and Poli-
tics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal" [Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, Vol. XXIX, No. 4: November, 1963, pp. 242-249].
However, my use of these terms in the context of national housing poli-
tics, rather than local politics, and in referring to interest groups,
rather than individuals, results in a substantial reformulation of
Wilson's use of these terms.
In Wilson's article, people exhibiting a "public-regarding" atti-
tude attach a high value to community-wide and neighborhood-wide goals.
These people are most likely to be citizens who rank high in income,
education, or both. On the other hand, "private-regarding" citizens
lean toward a narrow concept of self-interest and see in plans for
community-wide programs specific threats and short-term costs, rather
than long-term benefits. "Private-regarding" people usually come from
the lower and lower middle-class strata in a community.
In this paper, "public-regarding" and "private-regarding" refer
to the position which interest groups take in general with regard to
the role of the Federal government in housing. This application of
the terms, therefore, does not carry the same class connotations as
in Wilson's use of them. However, there is a basic similarity between
the two uses in that in both cases "private-regarding" implies a nar-
row, economic view of self-interest, whereas "public-regarding" sug-
gests a broad, socially-oriented view of self-interest.
7)
proponents of public housing. On the other hand, the "private-
regarding" groups view housing as a private industry and oppose
Federal intervention. Their position is that the federal government
does not have the right to interfere with the private market; and some
of them would -argue that housing goals can be achieved by private en-
terprise alone.
The groups which typically belong to each of these categories
are best illustrated by the supporters and opposers of major housing
acts. Tables I, II and III list the major agencies and organizations
which supported the housing acts of 1937 and 1949 and the 1961 pro-
posal to establish a Department of Housing and Urban Development. In
both 1937 and 1949, public housing was the most important issue in
housing legislation. Thus, support for each of these pieces of legis-
lation can be interpreted as a mandate for Federal intervention into
housing, or as a "public-regarding" position; whereas opposition repre-
sents a "private-regarding" stand in housing politics. As these tables
show, the former group is comprised of organizations of public profes-
sionals, representatives of lower income and minority groups, social
workers and religious organizations, and representatives of cities;
while the core of the latter group is made up of various industry
operators '- realtors, homebuilders, mortgage financers, materials
dealers and manufacturers, private apartment owners and groups which
represent state and rural interests.
The division between "public- and private-regarding" interests
in housing politics is not always clear cut. On specific issues, the
I17
special interests of groups often conflict with their ideological
"private- or public-regarding" stand. As a result, there is often
a crossing-over of liberal and conservative groups on various issues.
For example, the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Offici-als - typically a "public-regarding" group - opposed rent sup-
plements, because rent supplements would be administered directly
between the Federal Housing Administration and private developers,
leaving local public housing agencies out of the picture. On the
other hand, homebuilders and realtors were supporters of rent supple-
ments, because rent supplements involved direct benefits for these
"private-regarding" organizations. Urban renewal is another issue
which resulted in a reversal of the usual opposition from "private-
regarding" groups to Federal intervention. As Table IV indicates,
in one way or another all major interest groups supported urban renewal.
The "private-regarding" groups supported urban renewal because of its
emphasis on and benefits for private industry. "Public-regarding"
groups were forced to support urban renewal because of its stated
goals, despite the fact that by this time they were aware of a great
gap between the rhetoric and reality of the program.
In the 1960's, clashes between "public-regarding" and "private-
regarding" groups on housing issues have become less frequent and
intense than in earlier years. The absence of these splits is due
largely to the fact that liberals have adopted a new concept of federal
policy, on which housing programs have been based. This concept was
labelled "creative federalism" by President Johnson in May, 1964, in
2
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his "Great Society" speech.1 -Essentially, creative federalism implies
the organization of federal programs in a manner which will lead to
maximum involvement of private enterprise. The application of creative
federalism to housing policies has led to the formulation of programs
which offer economic inducements to private entrepreneurs to work for
social purposes. As a result, one finds that private interests adhere
less rigidly to their ideologically-framed opposition to federal inter-
ference in housing and that they are becoming involved in competing for
the benefits in housing programs. Thus, new approaches in the 1960's
have generated support for a federal role in housing from both "public-
regarding" and "private-regarding" interest groups.
Although the dichlotomy between "public-regarding" and "private-
regarding" is becoming blurred, these categories are still useful for
generally characterizing housing groups - whom and what they represent,
their typical views on housing policy and their ties to other groups,
to public agencies and to Congress. Therefore, as a means of providing
a picture of the component actors in the system of housing politics,
the following section on the major housing groups divides them into
these two categories and briefly describes each of them.
.Max Ways, "'Creative Federalism' and the Great Society," in
Fortune, Vol. 73, No, l January, 1966, pp. 121-123+, p. 122.
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.II
Private-Regarding Groups:
National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB): One of the earl-
iest organized housing groups in the Post-World War I period, NAREB
opposed the continuance of government corporations in the field of
housing; and throughout the history of public housing NAREB has fought
against it.2 The philosophic premise of the realtor group is that
home ownership is necessary for the general welfare of the country;
and, it views the idea of large numbers of people with the government
as landlord as dangerous and as an obstacle to the ultimate goal of
home ownership. NAREB has been one of the most active lobby groups
in housing. It helped to form the "real estate lobby" after World
War II to prevent continued government regulation of the housing indus-
try. The other groups which comprised this lobby were the National
Association of Homebuilders, the US Savings and Loan League, the Mort-
4
gage Bankers Association and the National Lumber Manufacturers. This
coalition of housing interests voiced staunch support for free enter-
prise and ardent opposition to federal intervention in housing. They
supported the Federal Home Loan Bank system and the Federal Housing
Administration over public housing. The lobby broke up in 1952, when
2 Timothy L. McDonnell, The Wagner Housing Act, Chicago, Loyola
University Press, 1957, p. 20,
3 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
4 Telephone conversation with John Dickerman, former executive
vice-president of the National Association of Homebuilders, May 2, 1968.
I
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Eisenhower was elected.5 Since then, NAREB, like all "private-
regarding" groups, has liberalized somewhat, particularly in recent
years. In 1966 NAREB supported rent supplements. However, it has
shifted less toward federal housing programs than the homebuilders.
For example, in 1965 NAREB opposed the creation of a housing depart-
ment and the expansion of federal activities in housing, whereas the
National Association of Homebuilders supported it. NAREB has strong
grass-roots support; hence local realtors have a strong voice in the
organization's policy. However, NAREB has a small legislative staff;
and therefore it is not as influential as the homebuilders and some-
times relies on the homebuilders to lobby for its interests. 6
National Association of Homebuilders (NABB): NAHB is one of the most
important groups in housing politics. It represents the homebuilders,
but over half its membership is comprised of architects, bankers,
lumber dealers, suppliers and other operators involved in the house-
building process. 7 NAIB began in 1941 as a pressure group in order
to maintain allocations of supplies to the private housing industry
during the war. It originated from the Home Building Institute, a
branch of NAREB which broke off and merged with the National Home-
builders Association, ,a ,federation of nine local associations in the
5 1bid.
6 Conversation with John McClaughry, Fellow, John F. Kennedy Insti-
tute of Politics, Harvard University, 1967-68, May 2, 1968.
7Robert W. Murray, Jr., "The New Face of the NA-B," House and Home,
January, 1962, pp. 108-113, p. 110.
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area of Pittsburgh.8 After the war, NABB was one of the major members
of the "real estate lobby." As in NAREB, the strength of NAHB has
rested in its grass-roots support from local homebuilders. As indi-
cated above, NAHB has adopted a more pragmatic approach to housing
policy in recent years than NAREB. The switch became most evident
when Nathaniel Rogg was made executive vice-president of NAHB in 1966.
Rogg was an economist, rather than a homebuilder. Before joining NAHB
in 1954, he was chief economist for FHA. He seems to symbolize a new
era in NAHB's attitude toward federal housing programs. NAHB began to
look at FHA and other federal housing programs as positive forces,
rather than as necessary evils, for bolstering the homebuilding industry
and the residential mortgage market.9 FHA and NAHB have always worked
very closely together and mutually supported one another's interests.
Many NAHB executives are former FHA people; and NAHB people have left
for important positions in FHA. NAHB defended rent supplements and
Section 221 d(3) housing, both of which are administered by FHA. In-
deed, NAHB offered meager support for Senator Percy's home ownership
proposal, because the National Home Ownership Foundation system would
10
have bypassed FHA. Ideologically, NAHB still would like to see hous-
ing goals achieved. through private enterprise. However, its major
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on
Lobbying Activities, Housing Lobby, 81st Congress, Second Session, 1950,
p. 338.
9McClaughry, o2. cit.
1 0 Ibid.
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interest is to expand the volume of homebuilding activity. The larg-
est untouched housing market is in low and moderate income housing,
which private homebuilders cannot reach on their own. Therefore, NAHB
is a strong supporter of many administration programs. Larry Blackmon,
who was president of NAHB in 1965, also a Texan, a Democrat and a close
friend of Lyndon Johnson, stated to the homebuilders that the Federal
government had provided homebuilders with the necessary tools, in rent
supplements and Section 221 d(3) housing, for producing low-cost housing
and urged homebuilders to make use of these programs. This change in
NAHB's approach to housing policy is a result of several factors: the
decline in homebuilding activity between 1955 and 1966; the recognition
of the failure of the industry to stimulate housing demand among exist-
ing home owners; an awareness of the need for research on how and why
people spend money for housing and technological innovations; mounting
pressures from government and other critics to reduce housing costs;
and a desire to profit from the large low and moderate income housing
market. 1 2  Thus, in order to promote its special interests NAB has
switched from a "purist" free enterprise position to a pragmatic, co-
operative stand on housing policy.
1 ournal of Homebuilders, Vol,
1 2 See Rogg's citing of major problem areas in the homebuilding in-
dustry in House and Home,
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National Lumber and Building Materials Dealers Association (NLBMDA):
NLBMDA represents over 28,000 lumber and building materials dealers.
It is not a particularly sophisticated pressure group. It does not
employ a full-time housing specialist, but rather assumes that the
same programs which benefit the homebuilders will also benefit the
materials dealers. Therefore, like NAREB, NLBMDA often relies on
NABB to lobby for its interests. 1 3
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA): MBA is a small organization and
has less grass-roots support than NAREB and NAHB, because mortgage
banks are not as widely spread as homebuilding and real estate opera-
tions. However, it is an effective pressure group, working directly
through Congress and also promoting its interests through close liai-
son with NAHB. It is generally opposed to direct loans and public
housing.1 4
United States Savings and Loan League: (US Savings and Loan League):
This group, which represents savings and loan associations, is one of
the most effective lobby groups in Congress.15 It is generally opposed
to public housing. However, since the breaking up of the "real estate
lobby" in the early 1950's, the US Savings and Loan League has "stuck
to its own knitting" and concentrated its efforts, on maintaining the
1 3McClaughry, op. cit.
1 4Congressional Quarterly Service, pub. Congress and the Nation,
1945-64, Washington, D.C., c. 1965, p. 462.
15Conversation with John McClaughry, Fellow, John F. Kennedy In-
stitute of Politics, Harvard University, March 7, 1968.
j -1.1. - - -
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autonomy of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.1 6 It favors assisting
low-income housing by insuring longer-term mortgages, which in turn
provide interest to savings and loan associations.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States - Construction Division
(US Chamber of Commerce): The US Chamber of Commerce was one of the
members of the "real estate lobby" and over the years has been a
"bastion of Conservatism."1 7 Until very recently, it argued that
housing was strictly a local problem and therefore opposed all
federal low-income housing programs. But in 1967, the US Chamber
of Commerce spoke in favor of citizen participation and income sub-
sidies and endorsed the community action programs of the Office of
Economic Opportunity and Senator Percy's National Home Ownership
Foundation bill.1 8 On the other hand, the importance of the Chamber
of Commerce is mitigated due to the fact that housing is only one of
its many interests and therefore receives only part-time attention.
1 6Dickerman, oP* cit.
1 7 Ibid.
18U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Sub-
committee on Housing and Urban Affairs, Housing Legislation of 1967,
Parts I and II, 90th Congress, First Session, 1967, pp. 1195, 1203.
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Public-regarding groups:
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO):
NAHRO was one of the earliest supporters of public housing. Almost
all of its members are on the public payroll, as public housing or
urban renewal administrators, city planners, urban designers, archi-
tects, or related public administrators, One of the original organ-
izers of NAHRO was Ernest Bohn, who was a member of the City Council
of Cleveland, a Republican state and local official and an energetic
politician. 19 Bohn was a pioneer in public housing- and probably the
major person responsible for convincing Senator Taft to support it. 2 0
As originally organized, NAHRO (at that time the National Association
of Housing Officials - NAHO) was not a pressure group. It was con-
ceived as a government service organization which would help local,
state and national housing officials in developing an adequate program
for low-cost housing and slum clearance.21 It never took official
stands on early pieces of housing legislation; however individual
members were strong spokesmen in favor of public housing. NAHRO is
still a very specific, very technical administrative group.22 However,
because of the growth of urban renewal activities, NAHRO has built up
a strong constituency in recent years. It is an urban-oriented in-
terest and the "voice of more planning control;" therefore many of its
19
McDonnell, op. cit., p. 57,
2 0 McClaughry, o cit.
21
McDonnell, o cit., p. 56.
2 2McClaughry, 3/7/68, oP cit.
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liberal views are anathema to the homebuilders. For example, NAHRO
pushes for amenities and innovations, such as open space, setbacks,
and community facilities, but is not very interested in whether housing
is multifamily or single family; whereas the homebuilders are only in-
terested in building as many homes as possible that will sell easily.
On the other hand, the members of NAHRO do have a vested interest in
the maintenance of the organizations to which they belong, and hence
are not always liberal on specific issues. In particular, they are
insistent proponents of the "public housing" formula and reluctantly
support subsidy programs such as rent supplements which are not ad-
ministered by local public housing authorities. NAHRO strongly favored
the establishment of a housing department and its ties lie with the
various HUD - controlled programs - demonstration cities, urban re-
newal, public housing and metropolitan development.
National Housing Conference (NHC): NHC is a coalition of about seventy-
five organizations with an interest in housing. It is considered a very
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liberal organization. Its president, Nathaniel Keith, is one of the
"best informed" people in housing. 2 5 Many well-known professional hous-
ers who were "frontiersmen" in the housing field - Charles Abrams,
Wallace Campbell, Boris Shiskin and David Krooth - belong to NHC. It
was the first group of public housers to organize, and from the start,
2 3McClaughry, 5/2/68, oP. cit.
2 4 McClaughry, 3/7/68, op. cit.
2 5Ibid.
I
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was a "real pressure group." 2 6 It was begun in 1931 by two social
workers (Mary Simkhovitch and Helen Alfred) and two lawyers (Ira
Robbins and Louis Pink). Their aim was to build up support among
individuals and organizations so that Congress would be forced to
consider a long range housing program. The original leaders of NHC
had close ties with Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, Harold Ickes (who was
in charge of PWA - where the first government housing program was
placed), Senator Wagner (the sponsor of the 1937 Housing Act) and
27
other government officials. Support was given to NHC by housing
authorities, such as Edith Wood, and religious, racial and political
groups. NHC has exerted most of its efforts in general policy areas,
rather than on specific programs. Its main concern is in obtaining
priorities for housing. Since 1954, it has been less in the fore-
front on issues of low-income housing than NAHRO.2 8
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO): The AFL-CIO's interest in housing began in attempting to
get the Federal government to provide housing for workers. For this
reason and because public housing provides jobs for labor, the AFL-CIO
is a "complete supporter of public housing." Because of its support
from labor, the AFL-CIO provides strong backing on housing issues,
which the non-labor "public-regarding" groups lack. 2 9
26
McDonnell, o cit., p. 54.
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Ibid., p. 55.
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McClaughry, 5/2/68, o cit.
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Ibid.
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United States Conference of Mayors (US Conference of Mayors): The US
Conference of Mayors represents cities of over 50,000 population. It
supports a broad range of housing programs. The support of the'US Con-
ference of Mayors is very important in housing legislation; however,
housing is only one of several urban issues which touches upon the in-
terests of the US Conference of Mayors.
Other interests: There are numerous other groups representing "public-
regarding" interests in housing. However, these groups do not add up
to very much influence in Congress vis-a-vis housing policy, because
they are not professional lobbyists or because housing is only one of
their interests. Among these groups are-the American Institute of
Planners (AIP), the American Institute of Architects (AIA), the Na-
tional League of Cities, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Association of University
Women.
The picture of the "system" of housing politics - that is, the
major groups., the interests they represent, and the ties among them -
which emerges from the above descriptions can best be summarized by
the following diagram:
27
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As is clear, the groups which.comprise the constituency, so to speak,
of HUD-controlled agencies are liberal,'broadly-based, urban-oriented
organizations, most of whose members belong to the public payroll.
On the other hand, the "private-regarding" groups are primarily members
of private business and have lined up with programs, such as FHA, which
tend to be autonomous, which operate within the market framework and
which support, rather than regulate, private enterprise.
Since the major entry of the Federal government into the field of
housing in the 1930's, the "private-regarding" groups have had the
strongest influence on housing policy. The "real estate group" which
is comprised of realtors, homebuilders and mortgage bankers consists
of some of the best organized lobbies in Congress. It has effectively
limited direct government intervention in housing and promoted programs,
such as FHA, which support the private market.
The power of the real estate group has rested in its grass-roots
support. Such local involvement is very directly related to the struc-
ture of the homebuilding industry. The homebuilding and real estate
industries are both highly localized. The average homebuilder operates
at a production level of twenty-five houses per year. Real estate of-
fices are located in almost every town and city. The banking industry
is less, but still to a considerable extent, locally-based. Between
these local members and their national leadership there exist well
established channels of communication. Policy is largely determined
by local interests. For example, policy in NABB can be made only by
the seven hundred - man national committee, which is comprised of
I . ......... 
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representatives from local associations. The twenty-five member exe-
cutive committee can only interpret this policy as it applies to issues
which affect the homebuilders.
In contrast, "public-regarding" groups do not have comparable sup-
port, and therefore influence, on housing policy. Although there are a
large number of "public-regarding" groups, for a variety of reasons they
do not carry the same amount of political strength as the relatively
small number of "private-regarding" interest groups. First of all,
some of the "public-regarding" groups (such as NAHRO) represent public
agencies, whose role is considered to be a technical and administrative
one, rather than that of a legitimate pressure group. Secondly, in sev-
eral of the "public-regarding" groups (such as AFL-CIO, AIP, US Confer-
ence of Mayors, NAACP) housing is only one of their interests; and
therefore these groups exert only limited efforts in the area of housing
per se. For example, the US Conference of Mayors, which represents the
major cities, is concerned with obtaining Federal funds to supplement
local taxes for many needs - community facilities, mass transportation,
open space, and education, as well as housing. Finally, many "public-
regarding" groups are voluntary associations, which are comprised of in-
dividuals who are socially concerned, but not directly affected by hous-
ing problems.
The important conclusion which this discussion points out is that
there exists a disequilibrium of influence in housing politics between
"public-" and "private-regarding" groups. That is, there exists groups
in the system of housing politics which represent "public-regarding" as
well as "private-regarding" interests. Indeed, there are a larger
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number of "public-regarding" groups than "private-regarding" groups.
These two kinds of groups have frequently clashed over major housing
issues. However, the relatively greater strength of "private-regarding"
groups has been reflected in the outcome of housing policies over the
past thirty years. These groups have effectively limited direct govern-
ment intervention in housing and promoted programs which support their
special interests. The major government program has been FHA, while
public housing has been greatly restricted. No substantial programs in
behalf of groups with the "most critical unmet needs" has been carried
out. Thus, a gap persists between the broad goal of a decent home for
every American family and the realities of housing conditions.
A second significant factor about the structure of the political
system in which housing policy is formulated and executed is the exist-
ence of a definite pattern of linkages between the component actors in
the system. Typically, the tie is a three-way linkage between a sec-
tor of private interests represented by a private association, a fed-
eral agency and a group of Congressmen. The two important linkages
in the housing political system are that among Conservative Republicans,
FHA and the real estate groups,* on the one hand, and that among liberal
Democrats, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and "the
public housers" on the other hand. A similar linkage also exists bet-
ween Republic Congressmen, FHLBB and the savings .and loan associations.
*Support of FHA being limited to Conservatives was truer in the
late 1940's and early 1950's. Because o.f .its long existence and suc-
cessful operation, it usually receives broad support now.
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The importance of these ties is that they signify an atmosphere of
mutual support between the public agency and its "clientele." In
return for special consideration for its interest, the client group
supports and defends the agency from attack and attempts to diminish
the agency's established base of power.30 For example, FHA has en-
joyed the "most vigorous and sustained support of homebuilders and
certain classes of mortgage bankers [and in turn] .... FHA has since
its inception tended to improve benefits available to mortgage lend-
ers and the builders of sales housing."31
Beyond an atmosphere of mutual support, the ties also symbolize
the characteristic attempts of special interests to control certain
segments of public policy. By "capturing," so to speak, particular
public agencies an interest group can assure that the agency's policy
will operate in its interests. To the extent that an agency is auton-
omous and free from review by other groups in the system, it is easier
for its clientele to achieve and maintain control over it. 3 2 This
helps to explain the degree of control which the real estate groups
have been able to obtain over FHA and the savings and loan associa-
tions over FHLBB. Moreover, so long as policy does not diminish or
replace its established base, the interest group which has isolated
3 0 Grant McConnell., Private Power and American Democracy, New York,
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966, p. 162.
31Martin Meyerson, Barbara Terrett and William L.C. Wheaton,
Housing People and Cities, New York, McGraw Hill, Inc., 1962, p. 285.
3 2McConnell, op. cit., p. 7.
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an area from opposing influences will be indifferent to what happens
in other areas of housing policy. For example, the US Savings and
Loan League has been concerned primarily with maintaining the preser-
vation of the autonomy of the FHLBB. In the debate over a housing
department in 1965, the League did not take a strong stand on either
side, because the autonomy of the FHLBB was not threatened. Because
FHA and FHLBB have existed longer and are more autonomous than HUD,
the ties between them and their "clientele" are stronger; and thus,
the control which economically motivate4, conservative organizations
have over housing policy is reinforced.
A third significant conclusion emerging from a study of the poli-
tics of housing relates to the way in which the components of the
system respond to inputs - or issues. When challenged, all actors,
public agencies as well as private organizations, act as interest
groups. That is, all these groups have established bases of power
which they seek to protect when change is proposed. This thesis dif-
fers from traditional theories of interest-group politics which see
policy as a compromise between major interests and public agencies as
impartial administrators of public policy. This thesis asserts that
whenever a program is proposed which threatens to diminish its power,
an agency, although perhaps not considered a legitimate pressure
group, will marshall pressure against the program. For example, FHA
was one of the stronger opponents of a housing department, because the
proposed agency threatened the status of FHA. This "interest group
reaction" of public agencies is explained in part by the fact that
public agencies have strong ties with private groups, as mentioned
above, and therefore are prompted to support these ties when chal-
lenged. It is also a result of the fact that the agency has many
technical and professional administrators active in a particular
field and therefore feels it has a legitimate expertise to bring
to bear on many issues. Finally, the interest of public agencies
also lies in maintaining its organization. A bureaucracy provides
job, social and economic status, and power, and policy change may
threaten any or all of these for members of that organization. All
of these factors compel a public agency to respond, like a private
organization, as an interest group.
This characteristic response has several implications for the
ability to introduce change into housing policy. First of all, it
suggests that public agencies - as well as private organizations -
must be taken into account and reckoned with whenever attempts are
made to inject new programs into the set of existing policies. In-
deed, opposition to or support for a proposed program will be char-
acterized by the combined resistance or pressure of public and private
groups. Secondly, it implies that a barrier to change is inherent in
the nature of government agencies themselves. Due to the aim of bureau-
cracies to maintain themselves, programs which add to, rather than re-
place or remake the federal bureaucracies, have a better chance of
being adopted. Thirdly, because of the ties between public agencies
seeking to maintain themselves and private groups seeking to promote
their interests, policies are less likely to be a compromise between
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interests than they are to be an amalgamation of the aims of all major
interest groups. Rather than replace one interest by another or trade-
off between interests, policies are more likely to satisfy the entire
arena of housing politics. Indeed, a significant aspect of housing
legislation has been its omnibus nature. That is, major housing acts
have typically contained "something for everyone" - especially FHA -
because every group has recognized the difficulty of passing legisla-
tion which diminishes the power of other organizations or agencies.
III
In summary, three major and interrelated aspects of the political
system in which housing policy is made will be examined in this study.
First, the controlling interests in housing policy are locally-based,
narrow-economic, "private-regarding" interest groups. They represent
the homebuilders, realtors, mortgage bankers and other industries
which are involved in the housebuilding process, and which have a direct
economic investment in the field of housing. "Public-regarding" views
are also represented in the housing political system. However, these
views are represented by groups which do not possess political strength
equal to that of the "private-regarding" interest groups. The resulting
disequilibrium of influence has meant that housing policy has responded
to the interests of "private-regarding" groups to a far greater degree
than it has to "public-regarding" interest groups. Secondly, there
exist three-way linkages between certain groups of Congressmen, certain
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public agencies and certain special interests, represented by private
associations. Typically, these ties are strong between an agency which
is autonomous and its clientele; and they symbolize an atmosphere of
mutual support between the two groups and their operations. As a re-
sult, the influence which certain private interests exert over policy
is developed and strengthened through these ties. In particular, ties
exist and are strong between Conservative Republicans, FHA and the "real
estate groups" and the same Congressmen, FHLBB and savings and loan
associations. Ties also exist, but are less free from influence by
opposing groups, between Liberal Democrats, HUD and certain "public-
regarding" interest groups, such as NAHRO, AIP and US Conference of
Mayors. Thirdly, as a result of their ties to certain special in-
terests and of their desire to maintain their organization, public
agencies, as well as private organizations, tend to act as interest
groups when challenged. Thus, opposition to changes in policy is
characterized by the combined resistance of public agencies and pri-
vate groups; and therefore, since public agencies do not really act
as impartial administrators of housing policy, programs tend to become
more entrenched and more difficult to either remove or remake.
These conclusions, which have been drawn regarding the system of
housing politics, show that housing politics are very similar to Amer-
ican politics, in general. As Grant McConnell has pointed out in his
book, Private Power and the American Democracy, Ia substantial part of
government in the United States has come under the influence or control
37
of narrowly-based and largely autonomous elites." 3 3 The result has
been the establishment of varying degrees of control and exercise of
public authority by the private groups within the public areas with
which they are concerned. This authority is available for reinforce-
ment of the groups' own discipline and, at the same time, for exploit-
ation of puli po.licy ini Lthe groups' own inLeresLs."-A This develop-
ment does not imply that government is, as a result, less reponsible,
but rather that it is responsible to a different set of values than
it might otherwise be. The nature of the constituency is very impor-
tant in predicting what interests and values public policy is likely
to represent:
The narrow constituency will have less diversity
than the large; as a consequence the policies
followed in the two settings will often be dif-
ferent. In the aggregate, as in a nation, the
two patterns will inevitably produce different
results. And these will appear in the form of
distribution of benefits to different groups and
in the favoring of some values over others. 3 5
In particular, a system of narrowly-based constituencies lessens the
possibility that policy will reflect the "public interest." This
argument is not meant to imply that the public interest is something
which is either manifest or obvious, but rests upon the theory that
"public values" generally depend upon the creation of a national
33Ibid., p. 339.
3 4 Ibid., p. 7.
3 5Ibid., p. 118.
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constituency."3 6
Far from providing guarantees of liberty, equality,
and concern for the public interest, organization
of political life by small constituencies tends
to enforce conformity, to discriminate in favor
of elites, and to eliminate public values from
effective consideration. The service of a multi-
tude of narrowly constituted political associa-
tions is often genuine. However, this service
lies in the guarantee of stability and the enforce-
ment of order rather than in support for the central
values of a liberal society.3 7
Applying these insights to housing politics, then, one infers
that the important result stemming from the disequilibrium of
"private-regarding" groups versus "public-regarding" groups vis-a-
vis housing policy is that programs with liberal, broad social pur-
poses are unlikely to be initiated and maintained. The broad, na-
tional goal of a decent home for every American family does not lie
within the narrow-economic, conservative interests of the groups
which exert controlling influence over housing policy. Stated
simply: I - G - "Interests do not equal goals." That is the eco-
nomic risk and material sacrifice usually implied in broad, social
purpose objectives lie counter to the economic interests of "private-
regarding" organizations.
In the next two chapters, the system of housing politics will
be examined in detail through a discussion of two important and
contrasting areas of housing policy: (1) FHA .- a housing program
3 6 Ibid., p. 8.
3 7 Ibid., p. 6.
39
which operates within the framework of the private market and (2)
public housing, (and recent low-income housing assistance programs).
In the last chapter, the housing politics systems will be evaluated
in relation to its goals and recommendations proposed for its re-
structuring.
TABLE I
Housing Act, 1937
Groups in favor
Labor Housing Conference of the
American Federation of Labor
National Public Housing Conference
National Council of Catholic
Charities
National Conference of Jewish Social
.Service
US Conference of Mayors
National Conference on City Planning
American Association of Social
Workers
Public Works Administration - Housing
Administration
National Association of Housing
Officials
American City Planning Institute
Farm Credit Administration
American Institue of Architects
New York City Housing Authority
New York State Board of Housing
American Society of Municipal
Engineers
Massachusetts State Board of Housing
Construction Code Authority
Federal Council of Churches
Groups opposed
National Association of
Real Estate Boards
US Building and Loan League
US Chamber of Commerce
National Retail Lumber
Dealers Association
Source: Timothy L. McDonnell, The Wagner Housing Act, Chicago, Loyola
University Press, 1957, esp. pp. 60, 73-75, 172-175.
TABLE II
Housing Act, 1949
. Groups in favor
National Housing Conference
National Association of Housing
Officials
American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organ-
izations
Veterans of Foreign Wars
American Legion
American Veterans Committee
Jewish War Veterans
Catholic War Veterans
Organizations representing the
three major religious denomin-
ations
US Conference of Mayors
League of Women Voters
American Association of University
Women
Urban League
National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
Groups opposed
National Association of Real
Estate Boards
US Savings and Loan League
National Association of
Homebuilders
US Chamber of Commerce
American Bankers Association
Mortgage Bankers Association
Building Product Institute
National Retail Lumber Deal-
ers Association
Associated General Contractors
National Association of Apart-
ment Owners
Source: Martin Meyerson, Barbara Terrett and William L.C. Wheaton,
Housing People and Cities, New York, McGraw Hill, Inc.,
1962, pp. 273-274.
TABLE III-
Proposal to Create Housing Department, 1961
Groups in favor
National Housing Conference
National Association of Housing
and Redevelopment Officials
American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial
Organizations
American Municipal Association
US Conference of Mayors
Americans for Democratic Action
American Institute of Planners
American Veterans Committee
Florida League of Municipalities
Alabama League of Municipalities
National Association of Mutual
Savings Banks
Groups opposed
National Association of Real
Estate Boards
US Chamber of Commerce
National Association of Manu-
facturers-
National Association of County
Officials
Council of State Governments
American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion
National Association of Home-
builders
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Establish a
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 89th Congress,
First Session, 1965, pp. 53, 55.
TABLE IV
Urban Renewal Provisions of Housing Act, 1954
Groups in favor
American Life Convention
Life Insurance Association of
America
National Association of Mutual
Savings Banks
American Institute of Architects
National Association of Real
Estate Boards
National Retail Lumber Dealers
Association
National Catholic Charities
National Savings and Loan League
American Institute of Planners
National Association of Homebuilders
National Association of Apartment
Owners
National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People
City Administrators, Philadelphia
Groups in favor
(with reservations as to
whether urban renewal
will achieve broad hous-
ing goals)
Housing Committee of the
American Federation of
Labor
Congress of Industrial
Organizations
American Council on Human
Rights
Americans for Democratic
Action
National Farmers Union
National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment
Officials
National Federation of
Neighborhood Settlements
and Neighborhood Centers
National Housing Conference
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Housing Act of 1954, Part I, 83rd Congress, Second Session,
1954.
CHAPTER III
The Politics of FHA
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The preceding chapter considered three major and interrelated
factors concerning the politics of housing. First of all, the system
in which housing policy is formulated and executed is comprised of
numerous organizations and agencies which can be divided in general
into two sectors: "public-regarding" and "private-regarding" interests.
Of these, the "private-regarding" sector has tended to have the strong-
est influence on housing policy. Secondly, close linkages often exist
between particular public agencies, their private clientele, and in-
dividual Congressmen - a relationship through which the influence of
housing interests is channeled; and thirdly, when challenged, public
agencies, as well as private organizations, react as interest groups.
Their special interest lies in maintaining their bureaucracy. These
factors have many implications for the way in which housing policies
are perpetuated and for the way in which policy changes might be
brought about. In this chapter, a discussion of the FHA program will
be used to provide a case example the way in which these factors inter-
relate.
The Federal Housing Administration represents in several ways
the federal government's major housing program. First, it has under-
written - and hence indirectly made possible the construction of -
eight million homes.1 Secondly, it has the largest staff of any federal
housing program; and finally, it is one of the oldest and most widely
supported of federal housing programs. In 1934, when FHA was proposed,
realtor, homebuilders and mortgage banking interests realized that the
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Sub-
committee on Housing, Housing Legislation of 1965, p. 166.
..... .. . .....
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forces supporting it were too strong for them to block; hence they
joined in formulating FHA's program. In addition, FHA's long exist-
ence and established reputation has engendered perfunctory support
from most liberal groups. Indeed, it is common knowledge that any
new proposal has a better chance of being adopted it it "contains
something" for FHA.
Although it represents a program of federal assistance to housing,
FHA has achieved support from "private-regarding" groups because its
operations are carried out within the framework of the private market.
The system under which FHA works increases the housing supply in-
directly by providing insurance for residential mortgage loans made
by approved commercial and mortgage banks. The chief impact of FHA
has been to engender a system of "FHA financing" - that is, private,
long-term, small-downpayment residential mortgage loans.
FHA is a self-supporting program. Through a reserve built up
from small insurance premiums, FHA has been able to cover the cost
of mortgages which it has insured and which have defaulted. Thus,
FHA is a self-sustaining, federal program involving direct partici-
pation by private enterprise. Specifically, the FHA program involves
direct participation by homebuilders, mortgage bankers, and realtors
and less direct participation by other actors, such as materials' deal-
ers, in the housing industry. The success of its public function (i.e.
inducing a greater supply of housing) depends upon the cooperative
actions of these major private interest groups in the housing market,
and hence leads to the establishment of close ties between FHA and
these groups.
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The linkage between FHA and the private housing market begins
at the local level. FHA maintains local insuring offices in almost
every major city in the United States. The officials of these of-
fices interact frequently with local realtors, homebuilders and mort-
gage bankers. They inspect houses, issue advanced commitments to
realtors and homebuilders, and approve local lending institutions.
Although all loans insured by FHA must be approved in Washington, the
recommendations of local offices are rarely disregarded. Thus, central
approval amounts to a "rubber stamp" signature; the. real responsibility
for who and what gets mortgage insurance lies at the local level.
Ties between FHA and the private housing industry build up from
the local to the national level. The homebuilders, realtors and bank-
ers are represented in Washington by NAHB, NAREB, and MBA (mortgage
banks), and ABA (commercial banks) respectively. All of these groups
engage in daily "semi-lobbying' activities with FBA.2 The overall
system which emerges from this pattern of relationships between FHA
and its clientele can be summarized by the following diagram:
2Murray, op. cit., p. 110.
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As is clear, the structure of this system closely parallels the struc-
ture of the housing industry. The operations of FHA are highly local-
ized, as are the activities of realtors, homebuilders, and mortgage
bankers. As a result, the grass-roots organization of private, hous-
ing interest groups is reinforced. While the policy of NABB, NAREB,
and MBA is largely determined at the local level, FHA decisions are
also made at this level. Thus, the structure of the system in which
FHA programs are administered is geared to respond to the demands of
local operators in the private housing market.
The fact that these "private-regarding" groups have in turn
responded to and supported FHA is a reflection of the fact that they
benefit directly from FHA programs. In essence, FHA has provided
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about $100 billion of risk free business for the private housing
market by insuring loans totalling this amount. 3 In turn, the supply
of mortgage funds has been expanded beyond what it would have other-
wise been. The ability of FHA to accomplish this objective, however,
goes beyond merely adding its assurance to private capital. As sug-
gested by Jack Berryhill in his article, "Agencies: How the FHA Got
That Way":
FHA...[had] only one thing to sell: its insurance,
which really means its reputation for soundness.
If the financial community ever thought FHA couldn't
fulfill its pledge, then the agency's entire raison
d'etre would be vitiated....
If the loans are so risky that the insurance
becomes bankrupt, FHA's pledge will be worthless.
And so, during the past 25 years, little de-
cisions here and there among FHA's maze .of opera-
tions have been made - always on the Conservative
side unless Congress ordered otherwise.4
Thus FHA, through its operations and practices, responds in numerous
ways to its clientele of homebuilders, realtors and mortgage financiers.
First of all, property approved for insurance by FHA must satisfy FHA's
minimum property standards (MPS). These standards set strict building
requirements which are geared to assure that the insured property will
have a high resale value. Oftentimes, the MPS require amenities which
simply increase costs, without necessarily adding to the livability of
a dwelling unit. Its emphasis. on marketability reflects FHA's adoption
3
1965 Senate Hearings, Housing Legislation, op. cit., p. 166.
4 John Berryhill, "Agencies: How the FHA Got that Way," in City,
Vol. 1, No. 4: November, 1967, pp. 34-39, p. 35.
5 Ibid.
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of the "sound business practices" of the private interests which it
serves. This businessman's approach results in the so-called "under-
writer's mentality" which characterizes FHA actions; and it stems from
FHA's desire to gain and hold the confidence and cooperation of private
lenders, homebuilders and realtors, as well as the agency's own percep-
tion of its role and responsibility. Moreover, this set of conservative
attitudes and practices is deeply entrenched in FHA. Indeed, it appears
that there is frequent interchange between top FHA people and NAHB of-
ficials, which would further dictate the character of PHA operations.
For example, in 1962, NAHB's policy planner became an FHA commissioner
and its construction department head became an FHA assistant commission-
er for technical staff.6
Secondly, FHA minimum property standards contain specifications
which serve the economic interests of particular groups - such as home-
builders, labor unions, and building materials suppliers. Indeed, the
"MPS-writing function attracts just about every lobbyist in Washing-
17ton...." These restrictions have often been cited and it is not nec-
essary to reiterate them all here. An example would be that only cer-
tain kinds of materials can be used in FHA-insured properties. Thirdly,
FHA protects the interests of homebuilders by avoiding the promotion of
new building systems; and the agency has served realtors by prescribing
regulations., such as. wide streets,. which will enhance property values. 8
6
Murray, 2. cit., p. 111.
7
Berryhill, op. cit., p. 35.
8
Ibid., pp. 35-36.
..........
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In short, FHA's conventional techniques reflect the fact that
FHA has evolved into an organization which is imbued with the con-
servative, middle-class, business attitudes of its clientele. As
a new agency, FHA feared that these private groups would not support
its operations, unless FHA adopted "sound business practices." Over
time, those attitudes and practices have become an integral part of
FHA and have shaped the way the agency itself views its role.
FHA's commitment to and support of homebuilders, realtors and
mortgage bankers is reciprocated by these groups. As suggested by
their statements, they recognize the important degree of influence
which they have achieved over FHA and are concerned that this rela-
tionship not be altered or diminished. For example, when the pro-
posal to integrate FHA into a new housing department was made in
1965, MBA responded that:
Because of the wisdom of the original statute, the
able leadership exhibited by its successive Com-
missioners, the sound business principles under
which its operations have been carried on, and the
obvious improvements that it has accomplished in
housing conditions and in building and lending prac-
tices, a unique relationship of confidence and in-
terdependence has been established between the FHA
and the homebuilding and home financing community....
Consequently, this association has a genuine concern
with any proposal that may in any way disrupt [this]
relationship....9
In essence, FHA represents a significant "piece of governmental author-
ity" which banking, realtor and homebuilding interests control. Pro-
grams which alter the pattern of relationship between FHA and its cli-
entele would endanger this control. As a result, attempts to broaden
91965 Senate Hearings, Establish a Housing DeptL., p. 203.
FHA operations or to introduce programs involving a high degree of risk
meet with strong opposition from the small sector of private interests
which FHA serves. At the same time, FHA, out of concern for maintain-
ing its organization, also reacts against policies which will change
its role and hence its established base of power. Thus, the interest
of both FHA and its clientele lies in preserving the status guo of FHA;
and therefore attempts to change FHA are met with their combined resist-
ance.
The combined resistance of FHA and its clientele to the establish-
ment of a cabinet level housing department is an example of the way in
which FHA and the private groups it serves together oppose housing poli-
cies which might broaden the role of FHA. The original bill, introduced
by the administration, did.not make any specific provisions for the
status of FHA within the new department. It merely provided that all
of the functions, powers and duties of the Housing and Home Finance
Agency, of the Federal Housing Administration, and the Public Housing
Administration in HHFA, and of the heads and other officers of these
agencies be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. During the debate three major
interest group positions emerged: one position opposed any establish-
ment of a housing department, a second position supported a housing
department, provided that the continuity of FHA operations was pre-
served by transferring FHA intact to the new department, and a third
position supported the administration proposal without any major
qualification. The following diagram shows how the various groups
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in housing politics aligned themselves with respect to these three
positions.
NO HLJD HUD/FHA Intact HUD
NAREB NAHB NAHRO
US Chamber of Com- ABA AFL-CIO
merce - Construc- NAMSB AIP
tion Division MBA AIA
National Apartment American Life Conven- National League of
Owners Association tion Cities
NLBMDA Life Insurance Asso- US Conference of
National Association ciation Mayors
of Manufacturers NHC
American Fram Bureau 
.National League
Federation of Insured
Savings
US Savings and Loan
League
Religious Orgs. -
e.g. Advisory
Committee on
Problems of a
Metropolitan
Society of United
Presbyterian
Church, USA
Bureau of the Budget
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, Establish a
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1965.
The purpose of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
was the creation of an agency which would respond to broad social pur-
poses in relation to urban and housing problems. Since HUD was seen
by "public-regarding" organizations as a vehicle for direct represen-
tation of their interests at the national level, the diffusion of FHA
operations within HUD would have diminished the tight control which
a small number of "private-regarding" groups exercised over FHA poli-
cies. Thus, the reactions of realtors, homebuilders and mortgage
bankers to the housing department proposal was largely a result of
their concern in preserving FHA.
Among these groups, NAREB took the most conservative position.
It opposed completely the creation of HUD on ideological grounds. It
viewed any expansion of federal power as a threat to increase federal
regulation in housing; and therefore NAREB was against any broad per-
manent role in federal housing. NABB took a more pragmatic approach
in the debate over HUD. Due to the strong Democratic majority in Con-
gress, it realized that the passage of Johnson's proposal to establish
a housing department was inevitable. Therefore, it developed a position
of qualified support - it demanded that explicit provisions be made in
the bill for transferring FHA intact to HUD. This position was also
supported by the mortgage bankers. The arguments brought out by these
groups emphasized the importance of FHA to their industries and vice-
versa. They stressed the mutual dependence between FHA and their partic-
ular sector of private activity. Hence, their position stemmed from
their primary concern in assuring the continuity of FHA operations.
In addition, FHA, although a government agency, provided little support
for the HUD proposal. As it has been pointed out by one author: "The
fight to achieve Cabinet status [for housing and urban programs] had
also to overcome the built-in reluctance of some officials who regarded
the creation of a new department as having a diminishing effect on their
established .power.."10
10
John B. Willmann, The Department of Housing and Urban Development,
New York, Praeger, c. 1967, p. 22.
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This combined resistance by FHA and the sector of private in-
terests which it serves was supported in Congress by both Democrats
and Republicans among whom FHA had strong support. As a result, an
amendment was passed which contained one of the few explicit provi-
sions concerning the organization of HUD in the final legislation.
The amendment required that FHA be placed intact in the new housing
department and that one of the assistant secretarys- also be the FHA
commissioner.
The significance of this amendment is reflected in the overall
system of housing interest groups and agencies which emerged after
the creation of HUD. It is one in which FHA and the "private-
regarding" groups to which it is tied virtually comprise an autonomous
sub-system of the entire system of housing interest groups and agencies.
The autonomy of this sub-system implies that it is relatively free from
accountability to the larger system - and in particular, to groups
which are "public regarding." Indeed, the position which "public-
regarding" groups took on the issue of HUD further suggests this con-
clusion. These groups supported the original administration proposal
which implied that the operation of FHA would be integrated into the
new department. Their concern was in seeing that all Federal housing
and urban programs respond to the bmoad purposes of the housing depart-
ment. Among these groups, NAIRO expressed this position most expli-
citly:
In our case, we strongly approve of Section 5(a)
provisions, which transfer to and vest in the new
51
Secretary "all of the functions, powers, and
duties of the Housing and Home Finance Agency,
of the Federal Housing Administration, and the
Public Housing Administration....
We would like to see all elements of the
program administered by the Department united
under a consistent philosophy and set of poli-
cies.
For instance, under the present HHFA set-
up, the private mortgage financing program of
the Federal Housing Administration is considered
by many of its employees - and many Members of
the Congress - as purely a 'banking' type of
agency concerned with the economic soundness of
the mortgages it insures.... Its philosophy,
under a department, would eventually beco-me con-
sistent with an overall national philosophy of
urban development.ll
The autonomy, which FHA has achieved, then, has resulted in a gap
between the impact of FHA and its basic public purpose. That is, the
risks which FHA takes are usually only those which are acceptable to
its clientele. For example, the rate of default of all FHA-insured
multifamily housing is only ten percent, a relatively low default
rate.12 As of 1964, the percentage of all dwelling units insured by
FHA in central cities was 41.9% and most of these units lay outside
blighted areas. Moreover, this percentage represented an improvement
in the extent to which FHA activities had been concentrated in suburbs
13in earlier years. Section 203 single family home mortgage insurance
111965 Senate Hearings, Establish a Housing Department, op cit.,
pp. 128-129.
1 2 H.T, Fitzpatrick, "FHA and FNMA Assistance for Multifamily Hous-
ing," in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXX11, No. 3: Summer, 1967,
School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, pp. 439-64,
p. 459.
131965 Senate Hearings, Housing Legislation, op. cit., pp. 49, 53.
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represents FHA's largest program. Under this program, 75% of the
people who have obtained insurance have been in the upper 50% income
14bracket. In short, FHA benefits primarily middle class persons who
are considered "safe" risks by conventional business criteria. Thus,
not only its practices, but also its goals have become imbued with the
influences of a small sector of private organizations. Programs which
serve low income people.are seen by both FHA and these private groups
as involving "unacceptable" mortgage risks.
From a more objective point of view, it can be said that the real
purpose of FHA is "to enlarge the area of total housing need which can
be served effectively by private, rather than public, enterprise.,1 5
When originally created, FHA was intended to induce private homebuild-
ers, mortgage bankers and realtors to assume risks they would not other-
wise have taken, Most programs which then involved a high degree of
risk have become standard loans programs, through FHA's leadership.
Non-federally insured mortgage terms have been adjusted to correspond
to the liberal low downpayment, long term credit programs underwritten
by FHA. Moreover, the volume of FHA business in these programs has
often diminished, as it was taken over by the private market where no
insurance premium was charged.16 Thus, due to the control which its
"private-regarding" clientele have achieved over FHA, FHA has lost
sight of its original emphasis. As it has been pointed out:
14Charles Abrams, The City is the Frontier, New York, Harper,
c. 1965, p. 51.
1 5Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 459.
1 6Berryhill, 2. cit., p. 38.
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If FHA is to take only such risks as are accepted
by the typical conventional mortgage lender, then
FHA cannot serve...[its) basic purpose. Further,
FHA's contribution toward enlarging the area of
total housing need which can be served effectively
by private enterprise must certainly be something
more than merely enabling conventional mortgage
lenders to make mortgage loans with longer terms
and higher ratios. If FHA is to serve its basic
purpose, it must accept a higher risk of default.1 7
The problem of regaining FHA's basic purpose implies introducing
a mechanism whereby the programs of FHA are responsive to broad social
purposes. In other words, the very tight-knit system in which FHA is
virtually controlled by a small sector of private interests must be
broken into so that "public-regarding" groups wil.1 also have a say in
FHA policies. For several reasons, however, such a change is very dif-
ficult to bring about. First of all, FHA has maintained its autonomy
within HUD. Thus, although HUD itself may be oriented toward broad
social purposes, FHA is immune from HUD's influence. Secondly, even
if a changed outlook is incorporated "at the top" in FHA, there is no
assurance that these changes can be communicated "to the bottom," due
to the localization and fragmentation of FHA. Thirdly, if low-income
housing programs are imposed upon FHA, FHA staff must not only accept
new standards of risk evaluation, but they must also learn to deal with
a new clientele. And finally, another barrier exists because, just as
FHA views the middle-class as its client group, the Public Housing
Administration views the low-income group as its territory. Therefore,
the mutual reluctance of FHA and PHA to invade one another's territory
must also be taken into account.
1 7Fitzpatrick, og. cit., p. 459.
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Recently, programs have been imposed upon FHA which illustrate
the difficulties mentioned above. The FHA Section 220 multifamily
housing program provided insurance for housing in urban renewal areas.
In order to encourage building activity in older' sections of the city,
terms which were more liberal than in other FHA insurance programs
were incorporated into Section 220. Two years after the enactment of
Section 220 in 1954, however, not a single project had been carried
out under it. An investigation by the House of Representatives revealed
that the basic cause in the failure of Section 220 -"to get off the
ground" was the intransigence of FHA itself, when it came to adopting
new attitudes and practices. As it was pointed out:
The facts.. .have convinced the subcommittee
that... by and large the agencies concerned
are in no small measure responsible for the
disappointing and frustrating delays which
have characterized the program. The subcom-
mittee believes that the basic problem has
stemmed primarily from the negative attitude
and philosophy displayed by many of the
Government officials concerned....18
Another result of the implementation of Section 220 - and of
another new FHA low-income housing program, (Section 221 d(3)) is
that both of these programs have benefited moderate rather than
low-income groups. Thus, the real test of FHA to deal with low-
income persons has been in the rent supplement program, enacted in
1965, and limited strictly to persons eligible for public housing.
This program will be discussed in greater detail in the following
chapter, but it is relevant to note here that it has encountered
18
1967 Senate Hearings, Housing Legislation, p. 49.
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a frustrating amount of "FHA red tape." Indeed, the rigidity of FHA
in undertaking the rent supplement program has caused Senator Brooke
to demand- that all subsidized housing programs be removed from FHA and
placed in a separate low-income housing agency, "so that the rent sup-
plement program (and others) can be made more socially and politically
responsive."19 Interestingly, this is the same solution which the
private-regarding groups would like to see, for it preserves the status
quo of FHA.2 0
The final implication, then, which emerges from this discussion of
FHA relates to the new philosophy of federal - local relations - crea-
tive federalism - and its application to housing programs, for FHA is an
outstanding example of direct private involvement in federal programs.
However, because of the lack of any mechanism whereby "public-regarding"
interests also influence FHA, FHA does not currently serve broad social
goals.
As Grant McConnell has pointed out, the danger which lies in a small
sector of private interests capturing control of a segment of public
policy is that the chances are less than otherwise that policy will be
responsive to broad liberal values. The FHA program indeed testifies
to his observation.
1 9Berryhill, 2. cit., p. 34.
20 See, for example, John G. Vaughn, FHA's Eternal Dilemma: To Be An
Insurance Agent or Social Worker," in The Mortgage Banker, March, 1966,
pp. 20, 42.
CHAPTER IV
The Politics of Publicly-Subsidized Housing
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The concept of public housing has been perhaps the most consis-
tent and volatfL-e issue in the politics of housing. Involving as it
does direct federal intervention in the housing market public hous-
ing is a program over which "private-regarding" groups have clashed
sharply with "public-regarding" groups since the first public hous-
ing program in 1937. The outcome to date of this battle bears wit-
ness to the controlling power of "private-regarding" groups in hous-
ing politics. Since 1937, two large-scale public housing programs
have been authorized: and each enactment has been seen as an impor-
tant legislative victory for "public-regarding" interests. In fact,
however, the passage of these bills was less a victory for "public-
regarding" groups than a concession of "private-regarding" groups to
the economic importance of public housing in temporarily bolstering
the private building industry. Moreover, renewed opposition from
private interests, once emergency economic conditions were over,
prevented the public housing program from being carried out to the
extent envisioned in 1937 and in 1949.
Toward the end of the 1950's, the public housing debate receded
into the background of housing politics, but emerged again in the
1960's. This time, however, the debate had a very new character,
reflecting the more pragmatic attitude of both "private-regarding"
and "public-regarding" groups toward housing problems and policies.
Public assistance to housing for low-income families no longer implied
direct federal intervention. Several alternatives to public housing
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were proposed. All of the new alternatives involved direct partici-
pation by private industry in publicly-aided housing. Thus, divi-
sions between interest groups over various subsidy proposals did not
occur so much along traditional lines of "private-regarding" versus
"public-regarding" interest groups. Rather, groups supported programs
which benefited their particular interests - and opposed those which
threatened these interests. For the first time, low-income housing
policy bridged the gap between special private interests and broad
public goals and issued forth general support from both "private-
regarding" and "public-regarding" groups.
The first large-scale public housing program was enacted in 1937.
As Table I shows, all of the groups which supported the 1937 housing
act were typical "public-regarding" organizations, such as NPHC (later
NHC), AFL, NAHO (later NAHRO), US Conference of Mayors and the American
Association of Social Workers; while the opponents were a small core
of "private-regarding" groups - NAREB, the US Building and Loan League
(USBLL), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and NRLDA
(Later NBLMDA). The groups which led the supporters of the program
were NPHC, AFL and NAHO. (Although officially NAHO was not a pressure
group, it had close ties with the New Deal administration and played
an important role in providing technical advice for the people who
drafted the Wagner Housing Act, ) These major proponents all favored
some kind of federal. - local public housing program, for slightly
1McDonnell, o cit., p. 57.
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varying motives. The main concern of NPHC was in a permanent, long-
range government program of housing and slum clearance; the AFL was
interested in obtaining federal aid to housing for workers; and NAHO
was interested in encouraging and preserving the system of local hous-
ing authorities which had grown out of an earlier program administered
by the Public Works Administration (PWA). The stand which these groups
took was based on their assessment of the housing shortage and the need
for decent housing, particularly among low-income families, and of the
inability of the private market to supply such housing. They also
emphasized the benefits which private industry would derive from a
federal housing program; however, their primary concern was with the
provision of adequate, low-cost housing per se.
On the other hand, the main interest of the groups which opposed
the 1937 public housing proposal was in protecting private enterprise
from federal interference and regulation. They viewed public housing
as socialistic and a threat to free enterprise. NAREB was the most
adamant of the groups against public housing. In general, NAREB
opposed any federal program which would supplant private industry.
It argued that the program proposed by the government would not bene-
fit the very poor and that any program which reached these people
* would involve prohibitive federal expenditures. Therefore, NAREB's
stand was that relief for poor people should be obtained through
2local or private philanthropy. The NRLDA also expressed extreme
McDonnell, Ibid., p. 82.
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opposition to public housing because it would compete with private
industry. Some members of the construction division of the Chamber
of Commerce were in favor of an emergency housing program which
would stimulate building activity. However, the Chamber itself was
formally opposed to any permanent, long-range federal role in hous-
ing, because it viewed housing as strictly a local concern. 3 The
USBLL argued that private industry could solve the housing problem
on its own, but recognized early in the 1937 debate that some sort
of housing program was inevitable, Therefore, it took a more prag-
matic approach and pushed for a restricted program, limited to very
poor families and tied closely to slum clearance.
All of the "private-regarding" groups were active lobbyists
and had established ties to important Congressmen. Both NAREB and
USBLL, for example, were friendly with Representative Steagall, who
was Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, to which
the housing issue was delegated. In general, rural senators objected
to public housing, because it was sponsored by "city interests;"
therefore they felt it would only benefit urban areas. Thus, the.
alignments which occurred in the debate over the 1937 Housing Act
and the arguments put forth to justify these positions tended to be
along traditional ideological lines: "public-regarding" groups and
Democrats supported a direct federal role in housing; Republicans
and ".privat.e-regarding" interests. oppos.ed it..
3Ibid., p. 83.
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The major factor which accounts for the ability of "public-
regarding" groups to obtain passage of the 1937 public housing pro-
gram was the depression of the 1930's. The importance of the eco-
nomic implications of the act to its passage are reflected in many
ways. For example, after World War I , during the prosperity of
the 1920's, very little public interest was shown in public housing.
As one author has pointed out, very few articles were written on
the topic of public housing and the pioneer public housing groups,
such as AFL and the National Conference of Social Work, did not dis-
5
cuss it at their meetings. After the economic crash in 1929, the
decline in building activity caused a "tremendous increase of public
16interest in housing." Between 1929 and 1932, numerous articles on
housing appeared in popular and opinion magazines.
The primary interest of the Roosevelt administration in public
housing was because of the program's capacity "to put men and ma-
17terials to work, to relieve unemployment." The nature of the pub-
lic housing program, as it was conceived in the 1930's, also re-
flects the importance of economic condiLions in giving rise to its
4During World War I, two government corporations had been estab-
lished.to provide housing for war workers. After the war, groups,
such as AFL, National Conference of Social Workers, and individuals
who had studied the housing problem, pressed for continuation of the
program, but their efforts were defeated by NAREB; and the corpora-
tions were disbanded. See McDonnell, Ibid, pp. 7, 8, and 22.
5McDonnell, Ibid., p. 51.
6
Ibid., p. 52.
7Ibid.
formulation. At this time, the average tenant was a typical working
class family which had been hit by the depression. Public housing
was intended to serve these people, who were not permanently poor,
as a temporary refuge during the depression. Thus, although the
interest of the groups which supported public housing in 1937 was
in the provision of adequate housing, their ability to obtain gen-
eral support for a public housing program depended in reality on the
economic Conditions existing at that time. Indeed, as Robert Fisher
pointed out in his book, Twenty Years of Public Housing: "Temporary
emergency conditions favored the enactment of a-permanent housing
8
program." (Italics mine)
The economic importance of the Housing Act of 1937, however, did
not mitigate opposition from private interests completely. They in-
sisted upon certain restrictions in the program, which would limit
the extent to which public housing could interfere with the private
market. In particular, both NAREB and USBLL demanded that amendments
be added which placed limits on the cost of each public housing unit
and which tied the program to slum clearance. The final act required
that one unit of substandard housing be removed for every unit of
public housing constructed. The extent of influence which "private-
regarding" interests had in restricting the public housing program
and in preventing it from competing with private enterprise is further
reflected in the way in which public housing activities were cut short
8
Robert Fisher, Twenty Years of Public Housing, New York, Harper,
1959, p. 229.
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during World War II. In order to provide housing for war workers, a
new administrative agency, the Federal Public Housing Authority, was
established under the provisions of the 'Lanham Act of 1940.9 In 1942,
this agency took over the functions of the United States Public Hous-
ing Authority (USHA).1 0 This arrangement was brought about due to
pressure from private groups who were insistent in blocking an ex-
pansion - and possible permanence to - the federal government's role
in housing. Thus, public housing constructed under the supervision
of the USHA through the Housing Act of 1937 totaled only 117,000 units.
The yearsafter World War II constitute perhaps the most highly
politicized period in the debate over public housing. Realtors,
builders and mortgage bankers organized in order to prevent continued
federal interference and regulation in the building industry. The re-
sulting "real estate lobby" was noted as a "very potent private lobby
group" whose opposition was directed particularly at the resumption of
11public housing.- .In each year,. between 1945 and 1949, attempts were
919
"Legislative History of Public Housing Traced Through 25 Years,"
in Journal of Housing, Vol, 19, No. 8: October 15, 1962, pp. 431-445,
p. 440.
10
Ibid.
11
Congressional Quarterly Service, pub., Congress and the Nation,
1945-64, Washington, D.C., c. 1965, p. 476. The political pressure of
the real estate lobby was so notorious as to cause Truman to state to
Rayburn: "'I do not recall every having witnessed a more deliberate
campaign of misrepresentation and distortion against.legislation of
such critical importance to the public welfare." (Ibid.) The activi-
ties of the real estate lobby led to a Congressional investigation in
1950.
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made by proponents of public housing to revive a broad public hous-
ing and slum clearance program, but defeated by opposition directed
by the real estate lobby. Finally, in 1949, passage of a.major pub-
lic housing program was achieved. The power of private-regarding
groups in obstructing its passage up until- that time is reflected
in the fact that:
A broad slum clearance and public housing bill was
finally enacted [in 1949], four years after it was
first recommended by Congressional committees on
post-war planning, the House Special Committee on
Economic Policy and Planning, and the Senate Com-
mittee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Redevelopment.
(Italics mine.) 1 2
The political environment in which the Housing Act of 1949 was
enacted was similar in many ways to that of 1937. The alignment of
groups which supported and opposed the act was the same as in 1937,
as a comparison of Tables I and II shows. The most important addi-
tion to the opposing lobby groups was NABB, which had been estab-
lished in 1942. Also, mortgage bankers had become more actively
involved in housing politics, probably due to their vested interest
in FHA programs. On the whole, however, the picture was exactly as
in 1937: a small number of "private-regarding" groups were vigorously
opposed to public housing; while a large number of "public-regarding"
associations supported it. Moreover, the arguments in favor and
against pub.lic. housing .in, 19,49 were the traditional. ones., . Realtors,.
121bid.
homebuilders and mortgage bankers argued that public housing was
socialistic, bureaucratic, a local program, costly, not aimed at
the poorest people, competitive with private industry, a job
which private industry could handle, and harmful to the moral fibre
of citizens; while supporters emphasized the housing shortage, the
inability of private industry to alleviate the shortage, the harm-
ful social effects of bad housing, and the need to utilize national
resources and to stimulate employment. Congressional support for
public housing divided along lines similar to those in 1937 - in
general Democrats supported public housing, while Republicans op-
posed it.13
Finally, a major factor responsible for passage of the Housing
Act of 1949 was the condition of the economy. As Chart I shows, 1949
was a year in which a major business cycle recession occurred, The
fear of a drastic slump in building activity was coupled with the
warnings in numerous post-war studies of the need for expansion of
the homebuilding industry, in order to accommodate the "undoubling"
of war families and increased rates of family formation. These eco-
nomic factors mitigated opposition from private interests just enough
1 30ne notable exception was Senator Robert Taft (R. Ohio). Taft
supported public housing because he was convinced that private enter-
prise would never reach the lower-income groups and Taft's stand on
public housing forebodes the switch which many Republicans from
urbanized states would later make to support federal low-income hous-
ing programs.
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to lead to a narrow passage of the 1949 Housing Act. Thus, as was
true in 1937, the 1949 public housing program contained many pur-
poses besides the provision of adequate housing. Indeed, the coin-
cidence of its economic implications with the interests of "public-
regarding" groups in obtaining decent housing for every American
family through a federal program of public housing is vital in ex-
plaining its passage. Although the 1949 recession made passage of
the public housing program inevitable, "private-regarding" groups
were nevertheless able to restrict the scope of the program. As
in 1937, the program was limited to low-income persons and closely
tied to slum clearance. The legislation provided that a twenty
percent gap must exist between the incomes of groups eligible for
public housing and those able to purchase housing in the private
market. In this way, "private-regarding" groups guarded a twenty
percent gap between public housing and the private market.
After the Housing Act of 1949, "private-regarding" groups con-
tinued to fight against public housing. Because of this opposition,
actual appropriations for public housing were severely cut back from
the amount authorized in 1949. As Table VI shows, excluding 1954,
appropriations were made for an average of 37,000 units each year
between 1951 and 1956, whereas 135,000 units had been authorized.
As suggested so far, throughout the first twenty years of pub-
lic housing, no substantial program ever really "got off the ground."
This outcome is largely the result of the controlling influence of
66
"private-regarding" interests in housing policies. The times when
public housing achieved sufficient general support were when concern
over economic conditions motivated public interest in this issue.
Thus, both in 1937 and in 1949, the ideological opposition of
"private-regarding" groups to public housing was offset by their
economic interest in the state of building activity. Otherwise, the
nature of the public housing program was such as to arouse extreme
opposition from "private-regarding" groups. That is, the costs of
public housing to private interests outweighed the benefits. No
mechanism in the program offered direct benefits which would mitigate
the ideological opposition of "private-regarding" groups to direct
federal intervention.
Thus, the "private-regarding" groups insisted on viewing public
housing as a temporary, emergency ec'onomic measure. They wanted a
very restrictive program, which would prevent any expansion of pub-
lic housing activities and possible entrenchment of the public hous-
ing administration, Once the economic conditions which pressured
the enactment of the Housing Act of 1937 and the Housing Act of 1949
had passed, private interests were free once again to renew their
ideological opposition to public housing, Hence, the "public hous-
ing debate" continued into the 1950's, with no significant change
in the relative positions of "private-regarding" and "public-regarding"
groups.
Indeed, during the 1950's, both sides became more locked into
their positions on public housing than ever before. As mentioned
earlier, private interests renewed their opposition to public hous-
ing and were able to obstruct implementation of the 1949 program.
Their attacks pushed "public housers" into a fight to obtain some
appropriations for public housing and to save even a part of the
program. These political battles forced both "public-regarding"
and "private-regarding" groups to adhere to extremely polarized
views. As a result, public housing fell into what Catherine Bauer
has called "the dreary deadlock" of the 1950's. 4 Both sides held
to their ideological "private-regarding" and "public-regarding"
attitudes; and neither side attempted to seek new solutions.
The ability of "private-regarding" groups to regain and to
maintain the strength of their opposition to public housing during
the 1950's was due to several factors. First of all, their opposi-
tion was no longer constrained by economic considerations, since
a quick recovery had been made from the 1949 recession. Secondly,
the onset of the Korean war made Congress inclined to hold back
appropriations for domestic programs. Thirdly, strong attacks at
the local level by "private-regarding" groups (sometimes charac-
terized by extreme, propaganda)15 led many communities to reject
14 Catherine Bauer, "The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing"
in Architectural Forum, Vol. 106: May, 1957, pp. 140-42+.
1 5
"Legislative History, o cit., p. 441.
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public housing programs. Fourthly, "private-regarding" interests were
backed by the policy of the Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower's
own view was that his administration should "mark time" on public hous-
ing, "while the merits of continuation were evaluated."1 6 Eisenhower
appointed Albert Cole as his HHFA administrator. Cole was a former
Congressman from Kansas, who had consistently opposed public housing.1 7
In addition, Eisenhower's PHA commissioner was Charles E. Slusser, who
was a realtor and "of the same mind" as Cole and Eisenhower on public
housing.1 8  Slusser took a very narrow view toward the public housing
program. He looked at it as a building program only and refused to
allow tie-ins or assistance to social and welfare problems. Finally,
the public housing program itself was exhibiting certain failures,
which both liberals and conservatives had noted.
The inadequacies of public housing were coming to light largely
due to the changing role which the program was falling into. The
average tenant served by public housing in the 1950's tended to be
quite different from the original public housing occupant. He was
more likely to be relatively poorer and unaccustomed to urban living.
The lack of physical and social amenities and the extreme degrees of
isolation and concentration in public housing, critics claimed, ex-
acerbated rather than alleviated the problems of this new class of
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid,
18
Ibid.
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tenants.
Unfortunately, "public-regarding" groups were unable to admit
these inadequacies for fear of losing a public housing program al-
together. The unpopularity of public housing among tenants and
local civic groups, as well as attacks by local private interests,
had broken up a great deal of local support for public housing.
Attitudes were such that many communities could only be persuaded
to build public housing for the elderly, rather than the poor and
disadvantaged. Little support came from these local areas to
"public-regarding" groups at the Washington level. These latter
offices fought alone to prevent the diminishment, or possible
elimination, of their established program. They concentrated their
efforts on squeezing out appropriations from a conservative Repub-
lican administration. The danger of losing their program meant
that they did not have the power to improve it. NAHRO, NHC and
AFL-CIO stuck rigidly to their argument that public housing was
the only answer to low-income housing.
On the other hand, "private-regarding" groups were equally
adamant in their opposition to public housing. They even went so
far as to suggest in 1956 that they would be willing to "sacrifice
the advantages the [Housing] bill contained for them for the
greater aim of stalemating the public housing program. f This
statement provoked the. FHA .administrati.on, which saw its bureaucracy
1 9Ibid., p. 443.
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threatened. The HFA administrator announced that failure to pass
the bill would "put a real crimp in FHA's operations."20 In short,
"vested interests ...were institutionali'zed,.. with the result that
all three major groups - lenders, builders and public housers -
[were] opposed to that kind of coordination that would permit more
flexibility and realism in meeting the full range of local needs."2 1
The loosening of the public housing deadlock did not begin
until the election of John F. Kennedy and a Democratic administra-
tion in 1960. Two appointments by Kennedy especially symbolize the
outlook and emphasis of the new administration. First of all,
Kennedy appointed Robert Weaver as HHFA administrator. Weaver was
a Negro, an "urbanite" and a public housing expert. Also, Kennedy
named as PHA commissioner Marie C. McGuire, who was another public
housing professional. Thus, for a change, "private-regarding"
realtors and homebuilders were not holders of key positions in HHFA.
Weaver's appointment was particularly significant, because he
symbolized the fact that the Negro problem, the urban problem, and
the problem of low-income housing had become inextricably related.
Indeed, during the 1950's a shift in the distribution of Congres-
sional support for public housing began which underlines this fact.
On the one hand, the segment of Democrats with Southern constitu-
encie.s started to voic~e opposition to public housing.. .The turning
2 0Ibid.
2 1Bauer, 2p. cit., p. 219.
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event for them was 1954 ruling in California which prohibited
segregation in public housing.22 Before that time, public housing
had not disrupted the patterns of residential segregation in most
locations in which it was constructed. As a result of this deci-
sion, public housing lost one of its major Congressional proponents,
Senator Maybank, a Democrat from North Carolina. When Kennedy
nominated Weaver the opposition of Southern Democrats to public
housing really became evident. The chief threatto Weaver's appoint-
ment came from Southern Democrats, who were led by Senator Robertson
23(D., Va.). Their opposition was based on their fear that Weaver
would insist on a policy of integration in all federal housing pro-
24grams.
On the other hand, independent Republicans, representing urban-
ized states, became a major factor in support of housing legislation
in the 1960's. Thus the emerging alignments were characterized by a
four party, rather than a two party, split: a coalition of liberal
Democrats and independent Republicans favored a strong federal role
in housing, while a combination of conservative Republicans and
Southern Democrats comprised the opposition.
These changes in political alignments were accompanied by the
generation of new approaches.to.the.issue of low-income housing. The
22...........
Housing Authority of San Francisco et. al. v. Banks et. al.
23New York Times, January 6, 1961, p. 1.
2 4 New York Times, January 7, 1961, p. 1.
72
Housing Act of 1961 set the stage for the way in which this issue
would be approached. Liberals had become increasingly aware of the
inadequacies of the "bureaucratic approach." The need for a more
cooperative atmosphere between public and private interests was
stressed. The most significant example of this switch among liber-
als to reliance on the private sector is the 221 d(3) program
brought into being by the 1961 Housing bill.
Section 221 d(3) housing was originally conceived to be a low
and moderate income housing program. Federal subsidies would be
provided in insurance for below-market-interest-rate loans and com-
mitments to purchase these loans through the FNMA special assistance
program. As it turned out, all Section 221 d(3) housing has been
constructed for moderate income groups. However, the important point
was that the proposal involved direct private participation in a hous-
ing program which was at least seen as a low income program. More-
over, for the first time a federal low-income housing program.
received general support from both public and private groups. For
example, in 1965, when the administration proposed to phase out
221 d(3) housing, strong opposition was expressed by both "public-"
and "private-regarding" groups.
Although there were several factors present in 1961 which made
the outlook for low income housing look promising - including an
authorization for 100,000 units of public housing, leaders of HHFA
who were "public housers," and a more cooperative mood among "public-
regarding" and "private-regarding" groups - the tradition still held
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that no substantial program was implemented. Since no alternative
to public housing had yet emerged, the extent to which housing pro-
grams met low-income needs was still dependent on the politics of
public housing. Private interests again blocked actual spending
on public housing - no appropriation was made for the PHA to handle
the expanded program.2 4 And, "just as they had following the pass-
age of the 1949 housing act, real estate groups and homebuilders
again launched strong anti-public housing campaigns." 2 5
The Housing Act of 1965, therefore, was extremely important in
that from it three new programs for low-income housing did emerge:
rent supplements, "turnkey" public housing, and leased public hous-
ing. All of these involved private industry directly in meeting
the needs of low-income groups. Along with this new policy approach,
the debate over publicly subsidized housing took on a new character.
Traditional clashes over public housing were replaced by divisions
over the distribution of the benefits from low-income housing pro-
grams. Contrary to the long-held assumptions of many people,
"private-regarding" groups were found to support subsidy programs,
provided that they were offered sufficient economic inducement. For
the first time a large scale low-income housing program was enacted
which had issued forth general support from "private-regarding" as
well as "public-regarding" groups. The debate over rent supplements
2 4
"Legislative History," op. cit., p. 445.
25 Ibid.
provides the clearest example of these emerging aspects of housing
politics.
As first conceived by the administration, rent supplements was
a moderate-income housing program. It was devised to pay the differ-
ence between an individual's rent-paying ability (i.e. 20% of his
income) and the economic rent, for persons with incomes too high for
public housing, but too low to afford housing in the private market.
The administration wanted the rent supplement program to gradually
replace the Section 221 d(3) below-market-interest rate (BMIR) hous-
ing program, because the latter program turned out to be too expen-
*
sive in the long run.
As indicated in Table VI, which lists the major groups in sup-
port of and in opposition to rent supplements, there was widespread
support for the idea of rent subsidies, but not for the bill intro-
duced by the administration. The first round of opposition came from
both liberal and conservative groups, which felt that subsidy pro-
grams should be directed toward the sector of greatest unmet needs -
the lowest income groups. Most "private-regarding" groups, such as
NAREB, NABB and the Apartment Owners Association, wanted to see the
rent supplement system replace public housing. NAREB, always opposed
to government ownership, as well as regulation, in housing, saw a
The expense of 221 d(3) housing was due to the fact that the
subsidy was fixed throughout the life of the mortgage; whereas rent
supplements could be adjusted as the income of persons improved.
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danger that the administration's proposal could reach middle income
groups; then there would be nothing to stop the expansion of sub-
sidies to all families. Therefore, it demanded that rent supplements
only be given to families with real need - that is, low income fam-
ilies who could not obtain housing in the .private market with 25%
(rather than 20%) of their income. In this way, government owner-
ship of housing could be phased out. Both NAREB and NAHB were also
against elimination of Section 221 d(3) BMIR housing, because this
program directly benefited homebuilders and realtors. The Apartment
Owners Association was "disappointed that the Administration's pro-
posal...[did] not view the rent assistance plan as an eventual sub-
stitute for public housing."26 It wanted an expansion of rent sup-
plements to low income, as well as moderate income, groups and to
existing, as well as new, dwelling units, because these provisions
would increase benefits for private apartment owners. The Mortgage
Bankers Association supported the realtors and home builders and
apartment owners. It wanted rent supplements to help the "truly
needy;" it also wanted rent supplements to apply to existing units,
which would otherwise be at a disadvantage in the rental market and
threfore subject to financial failure. In addition, a strong core
of liberal Democratic Senators representing nine urbanized states,
criticized the administration bill. These Senators were concerned
with the real effect old programs such as FHA and PHA had had on
261965 Senate Hearings, Housing Legislation, op. cit., p. 1046.
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cities. They argued that in many ways federal housing programs
appeared to have increased rather than eliminated urban blight and
deterioration. They wanted both to have a re-evaluation of these
programs in relation to their impact on urban problems and to see
more money put into housing programs. Their recommendations in-
cluded a request to lower income limits for rent supplements in
order to help "those who needed it most." Thus, their position
was less one of opposition than of lukewarm support for the admin-
istration bill. Their main concern was that urban ghettos would
27
be neglected.
While some 'rivate-regarding" groups with a more pragmatic
outlook on housing programs, accepted the idea of rent supplements,
it should be pointed out some private interests remained opposed to
federal assistance to housing. The US Chamber of Commerce asserted
that the history of Federal subsidies for local community develop-
ment and public housing evidenced very little constructive impact
on either of these problems. Therefore, it recommended a transition
from the system of Federal subsidies and controls to full local and
state responsibility for community development and renewal. The
NBLMDA was vigorously opposed to the administration's rent supple-
ment proposal. It testified that it interpreted the program as a
middle income program and therefore saw a danger in the program
easily expanding beyond the middle income range. Moreover, it
2 7Tbid.
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averred that no need had been demonstrated for the subsidy. Its
overall position was that: "There are some arguments for rent
supplements, but the objections to such'a program far outweigh
the benefits."2 8
The opposition expressed by these groups was backed by several
conservative Republicans, such as Senator Tower from Texas and Re-
presentative Fino from New York. These people were aroused by the
implications of socio-economic integration contained in the proposal.
Fino's response was that the proposal amounted to a "social planner's
dream disguised in housing terminology (by) giving the Housing Ad-
ministrator a blank check to federalize American residential pat-
terns and subsidize forced economic integration.
Paradoxically, the pressure to direct the provision of rent
supplements toward low-income, rather than moderate income, families
introduced a strong opposition from major "public-regarding" g&roups.
NAHRO argued that the rent supplement program was too costly and in
addition "administratively cumbersome and socially indefensible." 3 0
Its position was that the public housing formula was the best long-
term method for meeting the "low-income poor housing dilemma."3 1
It is evident in their arguments that the primary concern of these
2 8 Ibid., p. 518.
2 9 Congress and the Nation, 1945-64, op cit., p. 361.
30 1965 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 302.
3 1 Ibid., p. 304.
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public-regarding interests was in preserving the public housing
program. Their opposition stemmed from the fact that rent supple-
ments were to be administered directly between FHA and private
developers, leaving public housing officials out of the picture.
As representative of public housing officials, NAHRO wanted leased
public housing or turnkey housing instead, because both of these
programs were administered by local public housing authorities.
Thus, NAHRO was forced into a contradictory stand because of the
conflict between its ideology and special interest in the mainten-
ance of its organization. Although traditionally fighters for
public housing and public assistance to low-income families, they
also had a vested interest in the old public housing formula. Their
reaction seemed to reflect an attitude that low-income families
belonged to them, that this was their territory and only they should
administer low-income housing programs. NAHRO's fear in the diminis-
ment of its established based of power caused it to take a more con-
servative stand than major "private-regarding" groups, such as NAREB,
NAUB and NBA.
This switch between "public-regarding" and "private-regarding"
groups in the rent supplements debate reflects the new distributive
nature of the conflicts over federal assistance to low-income housing.
Programs now tend to appeal to - or threaten - the special interests-
of groups, and thus often weaken their ideological stand on housing
policy. Splits occur over specific programs rather than the general
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nature of the issue, such as public assistance to housing. Thus,
rent supplements achieved the support of private groups such as
homebuilders and realtors who would benefit directly from the pro-
gram; whereas it provoked the opposition of public housing officials
whose bureaucracy and domain of power were threatened. This distri-
bution of support relates in an important way to the distribution of
power in housing politics. It shows an adjustment of policy to the
demands of private groups, which exert controlling influence in hous-
ing policy. That is, the adoption of rent supplements does not re-
flect so much a victory for "public-regarding" groups as it does
support of "private-regarding" groups for a program which directly
benefits them. Indeed, the rent supplement proposal was not passed
until after it was closely tailored to meet the demands of special
interests. First, the persons eligible for rent supplements were
public housing, rather than moderate income, groups. Second, even
after this amendment was adopted, private interests blocked appro-
priations in 1965, because they felt that the guidelines which FHA
had drawn were not strict enough to assure that only public housing
families could receive rent supplements. And third, rent supplements
were further limited, through pressure from conservative interests,
by a "local rider" (i.e. local approval for a rent supplement pro-
gram must be obtained). Thus, by incorporating economic incentives,
low-income housing programs tend to offset the ideological opposi-
tion of private interests to public assistance in housing and to
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achieve general support. In this way, programs have a greater pos-
sibility of bridging the gap between the narrow economic interests
of the "private-regarding" groups and the broad social goals of
"public-regarding" interests.
To summarize, then, the politics of public housing reflects
strongly the disequilibrium of influence which "private-regarding"
groups hold in housing politics. As a result of private opposition,
public housing has been carried out only to a nominal extent and has
been of a very restrictive nature. Since, up until 1965, public
housing was the only low-income housing progra', the outcome of the
public housing debate meant that a negligible impact on low-income
housing needs was achieved in the first thirty years of housing
policy. In 1965, public housing finally was looked at as one of
several alternatives for providing public assistance to low-income
housing. Since that time, several other proposals and refinements
have been put forward. Because these new programs benefit "private-
regarding" groups they have, unlike public housing, been generally
supported by them. The implications which these shifts have for
meeting national housing goals will be examined in greater detail
in the final chapter.
TABLE V'
Units auth., 1949
135,000
135,000
135,000
135,000
135,000
135,000
Actual approps.
50,000
35,000
20,000
45,000
35,000
*35,000 units were authorized, but no new starts were in-
cluded in the approps. bill.
Source: Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and
the Nation, 1945-64, p. 483.
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
TABLE VI
Rent Supplements Positions
Groups in Favor Groups Opposed
ABA NAHRO**
MBA US Chamber of Commerce
NAMSB NBLMDA
NAREB*
NABB*
National Conference of Catholic
Charities
NHC**
National League of Cities
US Conference of Mayors
AFL-CIO**-
AOA*
Joint Center for Urban Studies
of MIT and Harvard University
National Council on the Aging
US Savings and Loan League*
*These groups favored rent supplements for people in public hous-
ing income groups.
**These groups opposed elimination of old public housing system,
Sources: U,,S., Congress,. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Housing Legislation of 1965, Washington: 1965.
and Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965 Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, 89th Congress, Vol. XXI, Washington,
1966.
CHAPTER V
Evaluation of System and Recommendations
This study has attempted to accomplish two tasks: first, to
conceptualize the system of interest groups and agencies within
which housing policy is formulated and executed and secondly, to
examine in detail, through two case examples, the operation of that
system. At the outset, it was pointed out that housing policy, to
date, has had little impact on the sector of greatest unmet needs.
That is, the main federal effort has not gone toward low-income
housing. In the 1930's, emphasis was placed on housing working
class families who had been hit by the depression. In the 1940's,
federal assistance went to housing for war workers and veterans.
In the 1950's, it was middle income housing in the suburbs and
luxury housing in renewal areas which benefited from federal housing
programs. In the 1960's, however there appears to be an effort -
in theory at least - to provide low-income housing.1
During the 1960's, the housing political system has been in a
state of change. Ideological divisions between "private-regarding"
and "public-regarding" groups have been obscured, for almost all
interest groups now agree that a housing program is desirable or
inevitable. Every interest group also wants to have a say in the
housing program. Therefore several new ways to administer public
subsidies have been proposed. Independent Republicans are playing
a game of "one-upsmanship" by attempting to introduce methods for
providing public assistance to housing that are more workable than
1Friedman, op. cit., p. 357.
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those solutions which liberals have advocated in the past. Congress-
men who consider themselves progressive liberals are criticizing the
old programs of the "old guard" liberals. Their contention is that
housing programs must be geared toward encouraging participation
by private enterprise. The "old guard" Democratic administration,
sensing the need not to be outdone by its political opponents, is
assimilating all of these ideas into its own program. The Percy home
ownership plan, the Kennedy tax incentive proposal and the 1968 ad-
ministration bill represent the output of these various factions.
All of these programs have in common a more sophisticated approach
to social planning than that which characterized the public housing
program. Each proposal recognizes the political power of "private-
regarding" interests in housing politics. By offering economic in-
ducements to private enterprise, these proposals have in general
achieved the support of "private-regarding" as well as "public-
regarding" groups. As a result, traditional ideological battles
have been replaced by disputes over the distribution of the pieces
of the "federal cake."
It is important to point out that the distinction between "public-
regarding" and "private-regarding" interest groups, which has been used
in this study, defines the self-interest which characterizes various
housing interest groups. The division is not meant to single out the
"good guys" from the "bad guys" in housing politics. Rather, under-
lying this theme is the assumption that every organization and agency
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will, as a rule, act in a manner which will promote its special
interest. To the extent that policy interferes with its special
interest and is empowered to do so, any organization or agency
will try to prevent such policy from being enacted or implemented.
Hence, "private-regarding" groups should be expected to approve
only such policies. as will result in material gain for their organ-
izations; whereas, "public-regarding" groups will favor policies
which help to achieve the broader purposes of their organizations.
Policy, if it is to achieve its intended impact must take into
account all of these interest groups, in the light of their role
in the housing process and their influence in housing policies.
One of the paradoxes of housing politics is that while there
exists a far greater number of "public-regarding" organizations
than "private-regarding" groups, the latter groups comprise the
controlling interests in housing politics. These interests, the
core of which is represented by NABB, NAREB, MBA, ABA and NLBNDA,
channel their influence through strong, grass-roots pressure and
clos-e ties with FHA. Moreover, their power is important because
they possess the organizational arrangements and technical skills
to convert economic and material resources into housing.
The way in which public housing was consistently blocked pro-
vides an example of the controlling influence which the small,
"private-regarding" groups have in housing politics. Public hous-
ing, as originally conceived, was politically unrealistic, because
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it threatened to pre-empt the private housing interest groups. In
addition, the public housing program was unsophisticated in terms
of the sociological and psychological theories on which it was based.
As a result, the program has generated very little low-income hous-
ing.
On the other hand, FHA does operate within the private market
and it has indirectly brought about the construction of eight million
homes. One lesson to be learned from the FHA experience, however,
is that if a program is too autonomous and bends too much at the out-
set to attract the private interests on which it depends, then it
will become controlled by these interests; and thus, the possibility
that it will serve broad public purposes is greatly diminished. As
one author has pointed out, federal programs must have "just enough
give and just enough take"2 if they are to achieve their public goals.
With some of these political realities in mind, it is useful to dis-
cuss and to evaluate the new programs which have been proposed to
date.
Traditional Public Housing: The failure of this program suggests
that no more public housing projects should be constructed. However,
this conclusion does not imply that the program can or should be
"wiped out." Existing projects still have a useful life; and public
housing authorities are established bureaucracies.. Their interest
2Abrams, The City is the Frontier, op. cit., p. 91.
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must be taken into account, as shown in the dispute over rent supple-
ments. Programs which will reform existing public housing units must
be formulated and funded. New projects should be built on scattered
sites, so that the public housing "appearance" is lost.
Tunkey Public Housing: This program is one of the more promising of
the new strategies, for several reasons. First of all, turnkey hous-
ing does not eliminate the administrative role of the public housing
authority. Secondly, it allows private contractors greater freedom
and cuts down frustrating red tape delays. As a result, public hous-
ing units are produced more quickly. Yet, under Turnkeys I and III,
the private developer does not have to manage the property. (One of
the problems in attracting private money into low-income housing is
that private developers are unwilling to assume the "headaches" of
operating decent housing in slum areas.) Finally, the program stays
in the hands of control of "public-regarding" groups, since local
public housing authorities accept contracts, choose tenants, and in
some cases manage the units.
Section 23 Leased Public Housing: For reasons similar to those men-
tioned under turnkey housing, leased public housing is a promising
alternative: it involves local public housing authorities, it bene-
fits private apartment owners, it is controlled by "public-regarding"
groups and it increases the speed at which public housing units are
opened. However, a major impediment to leased housing is that it
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relies on the existing housing supply. Moreover, the local housing
authority must show that the leasing of existing units will not put,'
a strain on the total housing supply in the community.3 Since there
is already a shortage of housing in most urban areas, the ability to
open many units under this program is limited.
Rehabilitation loans:
A. To nonprofit or limited dividend agencies: Rehabilitation loans
have both several advantages and limitations. First of all,
they provide a source of funds to upgrade the large number of
substandard units in most blighted areas. Secondly, they re-
present financing programs and hence involve techniques which
FHA is best staffed to administer. Moreover, this program does
not necessarily bypass local public housing authorities, since
these bodies are also eligible to administer rehabilitation
loans. Thus, Rehabilitation funds enable local authorities to
open new units more quickly than when units are newly construc-
ted. On the other hand, this program is limited because it
relies on existing housing. In addition, rehabilitation pro-
grams to date have involved high costs, which result in rents
that low-income groups cannot afford.
B. To individuals: It is generally agreed that the best housing
for the poor is provided by resident owners, who have an interest
3 William H. Ledbetter, Jr., "Public Housing - A Social Experiment
Seeks Acceptance" in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXX11, No. 3:
Summer, 1967, pp. 490-527, p. 511.
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in maintaining their property.4 Thus, direct, low-interest
loans and grants to low-income owners could be one of the most
acceptable methods of subsidizing politically and socially low-
income housing. However, the low rate of low-income home owner-
ship limits the number of people eligible for these programs.
Rent Supplements: Rent supplements offer many advantages in terms
of flexibility, benefits to private developers and cost to the govern-
ment. On the other hand, important difficulties which have already
been encountered, or are likely to be, mitigate against these advan-
tages. First of all, rent supplements are administered by FHA. Such
a program requires FHA not only to allow new standard of risks, but
also to administer an entirely new type of program. Training its
staff to work with new clients, such as nonprofit institutions, and
to accept a new program - in short, remaking FHA - is not a task
which can be accomplished quickly. Secondly, rent supplements are
a direct subsidy. Such welfare programs have never operated success-
fully. As the history of public housing illustrates, the fear of
helping people "too much" has meant that these programs are highly
restricted to the point of being practically impossible to implement.
Limitations on the cost of units which are eligible for the rent sup-
plement program are so low as to make the program unfeasible in large
cities, such as New York. 5 Unless rent .supplements are part of a
4
New York Times, May 27, 1968, p. 53.
5
Ibid.
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graduated income supplement or family allowance program which applies
to all income groups, experience in public housing suggests that they
will never "get off the ground." Thirdly, rent supplements have en-
countered strong opposition from conservatives who are opposed to
socio-economic integration. As a result, 'funds are difficult to
obtain, and when obtained, they are likely to be administered in a
conservative manner. For example, rent supplements have tended to
be applied to whole projects, rather than scattered units, thus con-
centrating large numbers of low-income people, as in public housing.
In short, rent supplements are not subtle or indirect enough to con-
stitute a subsidy program which is politically feasible.
Section 221 d(3) BMIR Housing: Although Section 221 d(3) BMIR hous-
ing has produced only moderate-income housing, it could reach low-
income groups if (a) the interest rate subsidy were increased or (b)
it was combined with rent supplements. Section 221 d(3) housing has
received strong support from realtors and homebuilders. Mortgage
bankers oppose it because it bypasses the use of private funds.
(They would prefer that the interest subsidy be paid directly to
banks.6) Section 221 d(3) is supported by realtors and homebuilders
because although the program allows a limited rate of profit, there
is quick return, due to the fact that there exists a large market for
6Saul B. Klaman, "Public/Private Approaches to Urban Mortgage
and Housing Problems" in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXX11,
No. 2: Spring, 1967, pp. 250-265, p. 262.
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low and moderate income housing. Hence, through large volume, build-
ers and realtors realize as much profit as they would from a few
luxury apartment buildings. Two major problems can be seen in Sec-
tion 221 d(3) housing however. First of all, it is administered by
'FHA. Since FHA is strongly controlled by realtors and homebuilders
it is very possible that Section 221 d(3) could be "taken over" by
these groups. The same kind of exploitation that occurred in the
Section 608 program could happen again, where the "take" for
private-regarding interests is exorbitant. Indeed, evaluations of
Section 221 d(3) housing have revealed very shoddy construction,
already. The buildings are unlikely to last forty years, but will
last long enough for realtors to sell out and make a healthy capital
gain. Secondly, Section 221 d(3), and also rent supplements, involve
FHA in an area which PHA considers "its" territory. The reluctance
of PHA to be undercut by FHA - as well as FHA's regard for the
7.
legerdemain of PHA - suggests that FHA is likely to implement these
programs slowly or, to the extent possible, channel them to moderate
or middle income groups.
National Housing Corporations: (As proposed in the 1968 Senate
bill): National Housing Corporations have a major advantage in that
they involve private industry and allow a great deal of freedom to
private groups. On the other hand, there is a real danger in the
7 Walter L. Smith, "The Implementation of the Rent Supplement
Program - A Staff View" in Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXXII,
No. 3: Summer, 1967, pp. 482-489, p. 482.
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autonomy of these corporations that-they will, like FHA, be taken
over by private groups to the extent that they do not -serve broad
social purposes. In addition, the functions of initiating low-cost
housing projects or helping to establish local housing corporations
will conflict with existing programs of HUD and the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity. Therefore, implementation is likely to reach a
stalemate as each agency attempts to protect its own bureaucracy.
In the light then of the political system within which national
housing goals must be implemented, it is at least a hopeful sign
that many of the new low-income housing programs are supported by
"private-regarding" as well as "public-regarding" interest groups.
However, there is a danger of reading too much into this sign and
exaggerating the prospect for any far-reaching, federal low-income
housing program in the immediate future. On the one hand, massive
public investment is necessary to reach President Johnson's goal of
six million low-income units in the next ten years (let alone five
years, as urged by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders.) Large expenditures are required for two purposes. Due
to the fragmented structure of the housebuilding industry, costs
of new housing are extremely high. Thus, the public subsidy must
also be high if housing programs are to reach low-income groups.
Secondly, it is politically unrealistic to assume that large expen-
ditures on low-income housing programs will be approved without
also providing programs which will directly benefit the majority
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of middle class Americans. The white middle class must be "bought
off," so to speak, if their sanction of assistance to low-income
groups is to be obtained. This two-fold need for massive public
investment, however, is confronted by the many conservative barriers.
The fragmented structure of the housing industry is also directly
related to the nature of the "private-regarding" interests in housing
politics. That is, NABB, NAREB and MBA are all grass-roots organiza-
tions, which tend to represent conservative, middle-class interests.
Such groups are traditionally opposed to large-scale, federal inter-
vention. Indeed, I would suggest that the subsidies required to
reach low-income groups are too high to obtain broad support in Con-
gress. In addition, the costs of the Vietnam war and the inflation-
ary trends caused by war expenditures make Congress even more reluc-
tant to appropriate large amounts of funds for domestic programs.
The other side of the coin, then, is that a technological breakthrough
in the production of housing is necessary in order to provide a large
supply of low-income housing. Although such innovations can be en-
couraged, by channeling research funds into housing, reliance on
technology is basically a long-term solution and does not improve
the prospects for the immediate future.
In conclusion, this study suggests the following recommendations
for re-structuring the political system of housing and for helping to
achieve national housing goals.
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1. Linkages between "private-regarding" groups and low-income hous-
ing programs must be established. "Private-regarding" groups play a
necessary role in providing organizational arrangements and technical
skills for converting economic and material resources into housing.
Presently, the major government programs which directly benefit these
private groups are ones which also tend to benefit middle income
groups, especially FHA. At the same time, however, mechanisms which
assure that these programs are responsive to public values must be
incorporated into the system.
2. One way such linkages can be established is to create more flex-
ibility within the existing public housing program. The turnkey
programs are a good example of how such flexibility might be achieved:
they allow greater freedom for private developers and involve less
direct government interference. In addition, they retain control in
the hands of "public-regarding" groups.
3. Another way such linkages could be established is to incorporate
programs which involve greater social and economic risks into FHA.
Section 221 d(3) is a good example of the type of program which could
be integrated easily into the existing system of FHA techniques and
client groups. However, there is a danger that these programs will
be "taken over" by the small sector of private interests which FHA
serves.
4. Flexibility and variety are important. No single program should
necessarily benefit all interest groups. For example, mortgage
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bankers might prefer turnkey housing to 221 d(3) housing, while home-
builders favor 221 d(3) housing. Such competition could loosen the
tight knit system of FHA, by dividing the interests of its client
groups, and hence provide an opportunity for the Secretary of HUD to
achieve stronger control over FHA. In addition, needs vary between
localities. Therefore, programs should have sufficient variety and
flexibility to accommodate local differences.
5. Finally, the federal government should direct its research funds
into three areas:
a. Reaching a clear-cut definition of the housing problem
and specific strategies for solving it. So far, most
cities are still groping for such strategies, because
they don't understand the causes of the housing problem.
b. Reducing housing costs through new materials and new
building systems. New methods will also help to further
"loosen" the housing political system, by bringing new
actors, such as large corporations, into the housing
process. The influence of such actors could dilute
the control which small-scale realtors, homebuilders,
and mortgage bankers presently have over housing policy.
c. Training public professionals. Such training would pro-
vide better staffs for local redevelopment authorities,
local housing authorities and local housing groups.
"Better public service" is a theme which is politically
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acceptable. The effect of such programs, however, could
be to improve the status and grass roots support of
"public-regarding" groups and hence offset somewhat the
disequilibrium of influence of "private-regarding" groups
vis-a-vis housing policy.
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